



Social Stratification

Author(s): Frank Cancian

Source: *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 5 (1976), pp. 227-248

Published by: Annual Reviews

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2949312>

Accessed: 04/04/2010 08:11

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=annrevs>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Annual Reviews is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Annual Review of Anthropology*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

◆ 9578

Frank Cancian

School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, California 92717

Social stratification is a basic element of social organization in all human and some animal societies. Interpersonal and intergroup relations of dominance and submission, rank or hierarchy appear wherever people live together; and most studies of social relations say something relevant to the topic of stratification. Thus, I have found no useful way to draw a line, even a hazy line, around the relevant literature.

Given the extensiveness and diffuseness of the literature on social stratification, I have chosen to focus the review on the three issues that seem to me most important in terms of past or potential contributions by anthropologists: 1. the relation of material surplus, population size, and population density to stratification; 2. the comparability of patterns of stratification and mobility in industrial and "anthropological" (non-Western, preindustrial) societies; and 3. the relation of ideology and behavior in the working of stratification systems. Under each topic the discussion is pushed toward general issues in social theory. This seems appropriate because there is now no generally accepted paradigm in which an anthropologist studying stratification may work.

SURPLUS AND STRATIFICATION

A great transformation has taken place in thinking about the relation of productivity to the evolution of systems of social stratification. The received wisdom of two decades ago saw surplus beyond subsistence needs as the key to stratification: the greater the surplus, the greater the stratification. In this view, there could be stratification only when one individual could produce enough to sustain more than one individual. Those who somehow managed to live off the work of others constituted the higher ranks. This idea, as a basic explanatory element in the evolution of stratification systems, needs a postulated stage in which early people struggled mightily for physical survival. In that stage everybody had to work and everybody was thereby more or less equal. With improved food production techniques, the emergence of surplus over subsistence needs permitted the emergence of rulers, and the existence of rulers

signaled the existence of surplus. This simple materialistic interpretation of the emergence of stratification was found in important works until a decade ago (32, 33, 44).

In the early stages of the surplus debate a crack appeared in the old facade. Pearson (39) found absolute surplus over subsistence needs difficult to define in simple materialistic terms. He argued that subsistence level is always socially, not biologically, defined; thus the illusion of an objectively measurable causative variable burst. Pearson's surplus was essentially an arbitrary quantity relative to the society that, by social convention, created it.

In his response to Pearson, Harris (21) found the courage to carry materialism out to its logical extreme, thus resolving an inconsistency in previous thinking. Previous thinking had seen the problem of physical survival as environmentally imposed in early human existence, but as socially manipulated and controlled in modern societies after the creation of a physical surplus. Harris's Neomalthusian invocation of unrelenting population pressure, as exotic and patently false as it might seem to the affluent academic contemplating him or herself as part of the supported classes, undercut this dichotomous characterization of history. Harris argued that population pressure eliminates any superfluous surplus in the long run, and that seemingly unproductive social institutions (many of which involve stratification) are socially necessary for material survival. While an outpouring of adaptivist reinterpretations of "superfluous" ritual and rank institutions followed Harris's paper (22, 31, 41), neither his full-fledged materialism nor Pearson's extreme "societal voluntarism" have come to dominate.

The facade was cracked further and irreparably by the new view of hunting and gathering societies (29). The idea that early people had to continually struggle for physical survival tumbled in the face of studies of actual work patterns in contemporary technologically simple societies and the simultaneous realization that many genuinely impoverished contemporary technologically simple societies are poor because they have been driven to marginal habitats by technologically more complex societies. It is now clear that simple societies cannot win a competition with larger more complex societies that desire their territory. It is still not clear that all simple societies lived securely when they had their pick of habitats, but many certainly did. Most important, it is clear that many simple societies, that lived in the most egalitarian of observed social arrangements, could have survived from the physical point of view on the work of a proportion of their membership. The potential for one person living off the work of another was there.

Two points have emerged in this transformation of thinking about the relation of productivity, surplus, and stratification. First, if there is a struggle for physical survival at the bottom of modern systems of stratification, it is as likely to be a recent creation as it is to be a vestige of earlier forms of human adaptation. Environmental control and material want for "them" (early people) and human and social control of physical and material needs for us is no longer a tenable basic orientation. The course of history can no longer be seen as a gradual ascent

to postindustrial society. Second, and more important for the theory of the evolution of stratification: the emergence of social stratification in technologically simple societies was not restrained by the inability of a worker to produce a surplus that could be used to support a ruler. Thus the emergence of stratification cannot be explained by the technological possibility of producing a surplus.

There is no new conventional wisdom as far as I can see, but two major trends have emerged from the basic reorientation described above. One is the replacement of the physical surplus idea with the more sophisticated social surplus idea that has taken place among some Marxist anthropologists. The other is the shift of attention from physical production as the causative variable to a view of stratification mediated through the consequences of population aggregation. I will review each briefly. Neither trend, it should be pointed out, has produced an idea to replace the simple evolutionary causal dynamic that was contained in the physical surplus idea.

Sahlins's work published in *Stone Age Economics* (45) is crucial to the popularization of the Marxist side of things, broadly defined. His statement of the observation that hunters and gatherers must move around, and that, lacking efficient transportation, they necessarily limited their possessions, neatly explains the lack of stratification based on the ownership of the means of production—though it does not explain the failure of some hunters and gatherers to appropriate the labor of others. And his observation that domestic units, if left alone, will not produce more than they desire for themselves, sets the stage for his discussion of the political aspects of appropriation of household production for extra-household consumption. He sees the political life as a stimulus to production. Deftly including himself in the old guard, he creates the new interpretation as follows:

... the chief creates a collective good beyond the conception and capacity of the society's domestic groups taken separately. He institutes a public economy greater than the sum of its household parts.

This collective good is also won at the expense of the household parts. Too frequently and mechanically anthropologists attribute the appearance of chieftainship to the production of surplus (for example, Sahlins, 1958). In the historic process, however, the relation has been at least mutual, and in the functioning of primitive society it is rather the other way around. Leadership continually generates domestic surplus. The development of rank and chieftainship becomes, *pari passu*, development of the productive forces (45, p. 140).

While the argument just quoted appears to be a suitable interpretation, for prestate societies, of the essence of a socially created and controlled surplus, O'Laughlin (35), in her review of Marxist anthropology, criticizes Sahlins for displaying vestiges of his former self:

In analysing the development of political chiefdoms, Sahlins argues that such political structures evolve from a contradiction between forces and relations of production. This sounds like a Marxist argument, but Sahlins' contradiction is immanent rather

than material; there is a difference between what people could produce and what they actually produce. Political structures therefore evolve as a means of realizing the surplus that is implicit but unactualized in the system. In fact, the contradiction that Sahllins finds lies within the forces of production, that is, within the technological system itself. Unless one ahistorically assumes the teleological rationalization of economic efficiency as the essence of human evolution, there is no way of moving from this supposed contradiction to the emergence of political hierarchies. In other words, there is a distinct continuity between Sahllins' early evolutionary work and that of his recent Marxian stage (35, p. 355).

Though she explicitly eschews any attempt at general explanation of the evolution of stratification in favor of a more orthodox insistence on historical specificity, O'Laughlin emphasizes the social nature of surplus in her own exposition of the Marxian perspective. The various Marxian arguments about the social nature of surplus developed by Sahllins, O'Laughlin, and others (see especially the journal *Economy and Society*) all contrast with the simple materialist position taken by Marxists (33) and non-Marxists before the recent revolutionary reconceptualization of technologically simple societies.

Orans's seminal paper on "Surplus" (36) represents the alternative explanation of stratification in terms of population size and density. He argues that the differences in social stratification in the societies Sahllins studied in *Social Stratification in Polynesia* (44) may be the result of population size, not increased physical surplus available for appropriation by and support of people of high rank. He shows that Sahllins has not demonstrated greater productivity on the part of individual workers in the more stratified societies, and argues that it is the greater number involved in a single exchange network that leads to the greater stratification. Always careful to acknowledge alternative arguments, including clear historical instances of stratification resulting from political conquest, Orans does nonetheless speculate about cause:

Even if it is true that population and degree of stratification are closely correlated, one might well argue that they are not causally related; apart from the correlation I can think of two reasons why they might be causally related, i.e., why an increase in population might contribute to increased stratification: 1) to administer a more populous society, *ceteris paribus*, may require more layers of administrative control endowed with more real power; 2) it may be easier to establish and maintain wide differences in prestige and privilege in a large society than in a small one where all relationships tend to be based on kinship and/or face-to-face (36, p. 30).

A more openly Hobbesian version of Orans's second argument is presented by Foster (18). It is simply that as a group gets beyond the size where individuals can know everyone else, responsibility for social control must be delegated, for unknown people cannot be trusted. This leads to ever increasing stratification as group size grows.

A third element in this population package is provided by Harris's interesting juxtaposition of data on the technoenvironmental efficiency of various systems of production (24). While the data are scanty, it is apparent that the shift from hunting and gathering to slash and burn to hoe agriculture for the cases Harris

reviews does not increase the productivity of work substantially. Rather the technological change brings more people together on ever decreasing amounts of land. Thus, the result of technological change at these levels may be, not increased production which is appropriated in a system of stratification, but increased aggregation of population which leads to similar results. Where he does see an increase of productivity, Harris also sees a distinct decrease of leisure and deterioration of working conditions. Boserup (5) pictures a related trend in her contra-Malthusian argument for population increase as the cause of technological innovation which permits intensification of agriculture on ever more densely populated land.

The population density arguments include an interesting series of explanations based on materials from relatively sparsely populated Africa (20, 53, 55). Stauder (53) in particular exposes the obverse of the Hobbesian argument from density by arguing that institutions of social control are less important if offending individuals can simply move away until time dulls the conflict.

All these arguments, both Marxist and non-Marxist, emphasize the social creation of stratification in situations where sufficient numbers of people accumulate and must share space. While they are just as consistent with their times (the late 1960s and early 1970s) as the emphasis on physical surplus was a decade or two earlier, they are better, it seems to me, because they abolish the separation of primitive and modern people on the basis of relation to the environment. We now see ourselves as continuing the struggle attributed to our most distant ancestors. The old hope that in postindustrial society we could free ourselves from stratification through producing abundance passed with the illusion of material control. And so did the idea that stratification resulted from the creation of a material surplus.

STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETIES

Anthropologists pay little attention to a number of questions about stratification systems that have been the central concern of sociologists. In large part this difference seems to stem from the fact that sociologists focus on the Western industrial societies where they live while anthropologists focus on other societies. And sociologists considering stratification systems think in terms of national systems while anthropologists work at the local level. Anthropologists concentrate on societies which they view as undifferentiated except in terms of kinship and personal characteristics. And anthropologists concentrate on cultural-ideal descriptions of institutions in more complex non-Western societies. In addition, anthropologists have traditionally avoided the quantitative analysis of anonymous individuals employed by sociologists in the study of Western industrial society and its historical antecedents. While the division of labor and diversity of approach has been productive in many ways, I believe it has led to oversimplified views of the "other" kind of society in each discipline, and that this oversimplification has in turn blocked realistic comparison across societies.

Moreover, sociologists are routinely viewed as apologists for or critics of the establishment, while anthropologists are viewed as more benign. In fact, the interpretation of social stratification in anthropological societies is important to the maintenance of the sociocultural systems in which we live. As is often observed: in interpreting "them" we are defining ourselves.

What follows is divided into three parts. I will review first the arguments for and against the idea that anthropological and industrial societies are different from each other, second the recent trends in attention to stratification by anthropologists, and third recent work on comparative social mobility. What follows includes frequent interpretation of the general theoretical and political implications of the material, because I believe these considerations are part of full understanding of the issues. This effort requires more speculation than I am comfortable with, but since every reader is a native, he or she may judge the analysis for him or her self and reject what is not useful.

The Shape and Character of Stratification Systems

Many anthropologists see a distinction between social stratification and other forms of social inequality along the lines developed by Fried (19). They seem to favor separate analysis of phenomena in the two or more categories the distinction creates. Others see a similarity among diverse forms of structured social inequality. They emphasize the similarities first and the subtypes and complexities second.

At the surface of the difference between the positions is a simple semantic confusion that must be clarified. "Social stratification" may be used in the general (broad) sense intended in the title of this paper to include all forms of social inequality from caste and rigid occupation classes to age and sex stratification. In this sense it is essentially equivalent to "social inequality" as it is currently used. "Social stratification" may also be used in a specialized (narrow) sense to include only certain kinds of inequality in which society-wide strata are clearly recognized.

The problem goes much deeper than the labels employed, for the use of the term "social stratification" exclusively at the lower (specialized) level of contrast embodies a commitment to a substantive difference between stratified systems of social inequality and others. Thus the distinction carries heavy theoretical weight, and the two approaches tend to be associated with political or value positions on the nature of human society. In the long run, I believe, the association need hold only in simplistic conceptualizations of the issues. Nonetheless, it is crucial in any current statement on the anthropological study of social stratification.

Here I want to characterize the extreme positions as displayed in recent books by Fallers (17) and Plotnicov & Tuden (42, 58). Plotnicov & Tuden represent the position that distinguishes "social stratification" from other forms of social inequality:

Social stratification . . . is a fundamental feature in the organization, maintenance, and changes of a complex society. Stratified societies display a distinctive structural

anatomy. Characteristically, each has *social groups* that (1) are ranked hierarchically, (2) maintain relatively permanent positions in the hierarchy, (3) have differential control of the sources of power, primarily economic and political, relative to their rankings, (4) are separated by cultural and invidious distinctions that also serve to maintain the social distance between the groups, and (5) are articulated by an overarching ideology which provides a rationale for the established hierarchical arrangements. Since these features vary in different societies, it is difficult to construct an ideal model of a stratified society which can incorporate all varieties.

Not all societies, however, are stratified. In unstratified societies individuals are ranked merely on the bases of sex, age, and kinship statuses (42, pp. 4–5).

Though they state that “All societies have a division of labor, evaluation of statuses, and unequal distribution of rewards and valuables, with the result that some form of social inequality is universal” (58, p. 4), Tuden & Plotnicov explicitly counter the idea that all societies are stratified.

... the belief that stratification is universal indicates a confusion among stratification, ranking, and individual differences within societies. Ranking—the evaluation of individuals and roles—is universal. But societies composed of ranked social groups that are organized on bases other than kinship statuses or biological factors, like age and sex, are not everywhere the rule (58, p. 4).

The contrasting position stresses the appropriateness of looking at the ranking of persons and “localized” groups in an unbroken status continuum. In his critique of the stratigraphic or “layer cake” image of society, Fallers takes this position:

The stratigraphic image of society, then, seems to have crystallized in the late eighteenth-century ideological clashes over hereditary power and status and to have been taken over by Marx as a means of conceptualizing the new inequalities of industrial capitalism. Weber’s view was a more differentiated one which societies as arenas in which groups of various kinds—especially occupational ones—struggle for cultural and political dominance, in the process reducing old inequalities and producing new ones (sic). This view, it seems to me, captures the modern situation more adequately than does Marx’s stratigraphic scheme. Nevertheless, the idea of society-wide strata has remained prominent in Western social science, including that part of it which has been concerned with American society (17, p. 16).

Fallers concludes his essay on the “uses and abuses of the stratigraphic image of society” as follows:

The term “social stratification,” then, has a certain historical appropriateness in contemporary Western societies. I suggest, nevertheless, that it is a poor term for which social scientists might well substitute “inequality.” Not only is it quite misleading when applied to the many non-Western societies in which thought and action about inequality center much more upon interpersonal relations of superiority and inferiority; it also oversimplifies by attempting to capture with a single graphic image the multiple bases of differentiation and inequality which exist within Western societies. Race, ethnicity, occupation, and regionalism are not reducible to “class” or “stratum,” and all these terms, to the extent to which they have meaning in non-Western societies, very often have different meanings there. . . . (17, p. 29).

The positions represented by Plotnicov & Tuden on the one hand and Fallers on the other may be identified with classic positions in the history of the study of social stratification. In very broad terms, the former fits with the radical tradition and the latter with the conservative tradition. Lenski, who characterizes each tradition in detail (32), is criticized by Dahrendorf (11) for oversimplifying the issues. Yet there seems little doubt that Plotnicov & Tuden are conscious of their affinity with the Marxist end of the political-theoretical spectrum, and that Fallers is appropriately placed at the Parsonian functionalist end. The radical position, simply conceived, must stress the possibility of real, society-wide groups or classes, while the functionalist perspective, simply conceived, must stress the complexity, interconnectedness and cross-cutting individual memberships in all kinds of social groups.

Since I find the reality of class or group interests obvious and compelling as an explanation of human behavior, and the importance of contradictory cross-cutting ties just as obvious and compelling, I am at a loss to choose between the orientations. I do think both positions have been used to underemphasize the importance of stratification in anthropological societies while they have different positions (stressing and underplaying stratification, respectively) with regard to modern industrial society. For this reason I believe they must be understood and eventually rejected as guides to the interpretation of stratification in anthropological societies.

The basic issue remains the degree to which anthropological societies will be considered comparable to Western industrial societies. There is little doubt that larger, more complex societies are different from decapitated peasant communities and small preindustrial societies in many ways. Yet if we attend to Fallers, they are not—except in certain unique historical periods—characterized by the kind of clear, distinct social groups described by Tuden & Plotnicov. While Tuden & Plotnicov make the standard disclaimer that all the elements of their ideal type are seldom found in any single empirical society, the contrast they set between stratified and other societies represents an idea that has long been popular among anthropologists.

My experience is almost totally consistent with Fallers's contention that anthropologists' thinking is dominated by the stratigraphic, "layer-cake" image of stratification. This image does not cause them to find classes in anthropological societies. It has rather the opposite effect. Since anthropologists seldom find the kind of clear strata and unambiguous groups described in ideal types, they usually conclude that they are working in an unstratified society, and emphasize the homogeneity of the population or the personal characteristics of economically and politically dominant individuals. This implicit comparison with an ideal type obscures patterns of stratification in anthropological societies. These patterns are often similar to patterns in industrial societies that also fail to conform to the ideal type.

When viewed in terms of their political implications the two positions are more complicated for anthropologists than they are for sociologists and other students of industrial societies. For some, anthropological societies represent

the alternative forms of humanly possible institutional structure that could exist in a reformed state of industrial societies. Thus the anthropologist who sees no clear patterns of stratification in nonindustrial societies offers an alternative societal type to the reformer who sees class in our society and hopes to change it. And the anthropologist who sees stratification in nonindustrial societies that is comparable to stratification in industrial societies cuts off that simple alternative. These issues make the choices involved in the analysis of stratification in anthropological societies particularly loaded ones.

Stratification Involving Anthropological Societies

Any student of rural people in other countries knows that a large proportion of the world's population, as it is studied by anthropologists, falls between Plotnicov & Tuden's (42) stratified type and kinship rank type. This amorphous majority of non-Western people, usually labeled peasants, is commonly treated as an undifferentiated mass residing in homogeneous communities that occupy the bottom rung of the national stratification system. In recent years two different steps away from the homogeneous conceptualizations that impede study of stratification have been taken. Anthropologists have begun to study both the regional, national, and international systems in which peasant communities are embedded on the one hand, and the internal differentiation of peasant communities on the other. Both these very different trends involve greater anthropological attention to social stratification.

The first trend focuses on the *larger system* and includes the rapidly expanding literature on internal colonialism, dependency theory, and core-periphery relations to which anthropologists are minority contributors. Broadly conceived, the literature includes the culturally oriented development from the dual society conception to cultural pluralism at one extreme and the world system ideas of the sociologists like Wallerstein (61) at the other. The former has tenuous credentials for the study of social stratification, for, as Benedict points out, the cultural pluralism concept "may be more useful for work on cultural differences within a society than for examining the political and economic structure of that society" (2, p. 29). And the latter, as O'Laughlin (35) points out, demands almost complete abandonment of anthropology's disciplinary boundaries. The middle range of this literature includes the work of many anthropologists who have actively studied the context of local communities and the larger systems themselves. Some of these are: R. N. Adams (1), G. A. Collier (10), A. Leeds (30), S. F. Silverman (46), G. W. Skinner (48), C. A. Smith (49), R. Stavenhagen (54), and E. R. Wolf (62-64).

While in some senses this literature may be seen as the belated, self-conscious extension of Kroeber's classic definition of peasant societies as part-societies and part-cultures that cannot exist without the city, it represents a very important reorientation of anthropological effort away from the local level and toward regional, national, and international systems that include the peasant community as a dynamic element. Peasants are tied to the larger system, albeit in an asymmetrical way. They become full-fledged, if severely disadvantaged, actors

in the larger society. In this analysis peasant communities often remain internally undifferentiated, but they are no longer the pristine cultural isolates so common a decade or two ago.

The second trend focuses on *internal differentiation* in peasant communities, and emphasizes the wealth and prestige differences within the societies that anthropologists have commonly treated as homogeneous. While the focus on the larger system discussed above abandons the local emphasis of anthropology and retains the view of the peasant communities as homogeneous, this approach abandons the homogeneity and retains the local emphasis. It adopts some of the anonymous, quantitative, sociological classification of people which conflicts with traditional anthropological explanations in terms of kinship and individual characteristics. The work of F. Cancian (6, 8), B. DeWalt (13), S. F. Silverman (47), and R. A. Thompson (56), among others, shows that the division of small, poor communities into rich and poor, high and low prestige people reveals internal behavior patterns very similar to those found in Western industrial societies. This attempt to generalize across diverse societies, and the related relegation of cultural differences to secondary status in the analysis, threatens to raise many of the issues of comparability that dominated the abortive debate between the substantivist and formalists in economic anthropology (7). Pelto & Pelto (40) have pointed out how this type of analysis of intra-cultural, intra-societal diversity relieves people in anthropological societies of the indignity of culturally dominated lives that they suffer when viewed as homogeneous and different from people in Western industrial societies.

Both the trends discussed here run counter to the tendency to separate anthropological societies from industrial societies in the study of social stratification. While typological differences between societies will remain an important area of anthropological concern, it is clear that the characteristic isolation and homogenization of anthropological societies that impeded the study of social stratification is lessening. Anthropologists are becoming active students of stratification, rather than simple reporters of contrastive systems.

Mobility and Openness of Stratification Systems

In most conceptions of stratification, individuals or groups have both a position in the hierarchy and a potential for changing that position. Systems where change is seen as relatively frequent are labeled open or flexible; those where change is seen as relatively rare are labeled closed or rigid. The latter are often identified with traditional agrarian societies where position is in large part ascribed, the former with modern industrial societies where position is in large part achieved. Since anthropologists tend to work with traditional societies, mobility has not been a subject of great concern. This is especially true, of course, because they have not concentrated on the internal differentiation that logically must precede mobility. With the advent of "modernization," however, anthropologists have been drawn to comparison of traditional and "modern" periods in anthropological societies, and to comparison of mobility rates.

The accumulated evidence is far from adequate to support firm conclusions, but two very important generalizations are emerging. First, insofar as it is possible to compare traditional and modern societies, modern societies may be less open. Kelley & Perlman (26), who set their study of mobility among the Toro of Western Uganda in the context of the relevant sociological literature, conclude, as does Fallers (17), that the modern educational system leads to greater rigidification rather than greater openness. While both these cases are from East Africa, where relatively abundant land may create a special situation, the generalization is nonetheless fascinating. More findings along these lines would upset the received wisdom about traditional and modern societies, and force reevaluation of the conclusion about relative mobility rates that has been uncritically drawn from the conceptual distinction between ascribed and achieved status systems.

Second, comparative studies by sociologists suggest that it is difficult to establish differences in mobility rates among industrial societies given current approaches to the problem. The best available studies do not show substantial differences in the commonly expected directions, e.g. between the United States and Europe (27, 57). Kelley (personal communication) has found few existing anthropological studies with data adequate for comparison with industrial societies.

This theoretical disarray and need for data and new generalizations creates an opportunity for substantial contributions by anthropologists focusing on traditional societies. The process would involve two steps, neither of which is common in current anthropological work. First, patterns of stratification must be identified in communities where they have traditionally been ignored or treated as culturally specific, rigid, ascribed role allocations; and second, inter-generational mobility must be studied.

Since the few actual comparisons do not support the received wisdom distinguishing traditional and modern societies, it is hard to avoid the speculation that the received wisdom stems from blinders created by our position in society. It may be that the characterization of traditional societies as less mobile than modern societies serves to relieve the contradiction between egalitarian ideology and actual stratification in the Western industrial democracies where most scholars who make these characterizations work.

EXPERIENCE AND IDEOLOGY IN STRATIFICATION

The importance of ideology and subjective experience, of meaning and mental culture, is the subject of great debate in the study of social stratification. The explicitly stated positions extend across the entire current range of ideas on the status of mental and cultural phenomena, and display the chasm that separates symbolic and behavioral anthropology. I will first review recent positions on the relation of ideology and behavior—the question that dominates the debate viewed over a long time span; then concentrate on the study of ambiguity in

ideological systems that has become a major focus for many anthropologists in recent years.

Ideology and Behavior

It is useful to begin with three concepts: ideology, behavior, and action. The distinction between ideology and behavior is related to the old theory-practice, thinking-doing distinction, which itself parallels the older mind-body distinction; but, once again, antiquity and ubiquity are guarantees that the problem will persist, not promises of a solution. At the outset I want to assign cultural assumptions, cognitive apparatus, conceptions of the desirable, values and norms to ideology. Behavior is what happens outside the mind—observable behavior conceptualized and reported by the investigator. At this point, a commitment on the role of the investigator in the construction of observations seems unnecessary. Action is a term commonly used for behavior complete with the ideology that gives it meaning, or, if you take the other point of view, of ideology complete with the behavior that gives it mundane expression.

There often appears in the discussion of the relation of behavior and ideology the idea that ideology is, by its nature, shared among individuals and therefore connected with social theories that begin with the group—with society as a precondition for the existence of the individual; and the corresponding idea that behavior is connected with an individualistic bias under which the existence of the individual is a precondition for the existence of society. While largely correct as a generalization about the history of theories of society, this distinction has no clear and forceful logical standing. Its application in the study of social stratification is beautifully illustrated by Dumont's *Homo Hierarchicus* (15), a polemical work on the Hindu caste system. In what follows I will review Dumont's position, the work of Berreman and others who do not support Dumont's view of the caste system, and the work of Ossowski and Dahrendorf relevant to the general problem of ideology and experience in social stratification.

DUMONT Dumont presents a clear set of assertions favoring the predominance of ideology in social reality. Beginning his study with a wholesale commitment to a Durkheimian position on the importance of mind and its social character, he uses the language of action:

. . . the social is often considered exclusively as a matter of the behavior of individuals, individuals who are assumed to be fully formed in advance. In this regard, it is enough to observe that actual men do not *behave*: they *act* with an idea in their heads, perhaps that of conforming to custom. . . .

It is the prime merit of French sociology to have insisted, in virtue of its intellectualism, on the presence of society in the mind of each man (15, pp. 5–6).

This starting point leads Dumont to the formula which characterizes the non-ideological component of action as a residual:

Once what happens on the plane of observation O is related to a first plane of reference, the plane of ideology I, it brings to light another component situated in the residual plane R ($o=i+r$). From observation and ideology we deduce by "subtraction" the residual empirical component of each observed phenomenon (15, p. 38).

The strength of Dumont's commitment to the predominant importance of ideology is perhaps best communicated by his scholarly qualification, in a footnote, that ideology ". . . is not the *whole* of social reality" (15, p. 264).

Dumont's goal is to understand the ideology of the caste system. For the Westerner to do this, he insists, he must first break the Western preconception that people are first individuals, then members of society. Dumont's thumbnail sketch of Western thought leads him to the conclusion that "After a long period dominated by a tendency which led to atomization, the essential problem for contemporary thought is to rediscover the meaning of wholes and systems" (15, p. 41). It is in this spirit that he offers the caste system as an example of a system that begins with the principle of hierarchy, a principle stated at the system level and including the individual only as part of the system. Dumont's book is dedicated to the task of loosening the Western mind sufficiently to allow it to comprehend such a starting point.

The principle of equality and the principle of hierarchy are facts, indeed they are among the most constraining facts, of political and social life. There is no space here to dwell upon the question of the place of ideology in social life; as far as methodology is concerned, all that follows, both in outline and in detail, aims to answer this question (15, p. 3).

More concretely, Dumont is concerned to show that, by virtue of its ideology, the caste system is more than simply a super rigid and explicit class system. For from his point of view, which starts with ideology, the caste system is clearly distinct from a class system which combines rigid and clear behavioral class with egalitarian ideology. And, of course, insofar as action is the focus of attention, hierarchical ideology plus rigid groups in which membership is determined by birth, are clearly different from egalitarian ideology plus rigid groups in which membership is determined by birth. Dumont is particularly concerned to draw out the implications of the difference for egalitarians who engage in self-flagellation over the antirational character of stratification and Hindus who presumably accept the naturalness of hierarchy (14).

BERREMAN AND OTHERS ON CASTE Berreman's views on "Caste in India and the United States" (3) provide a clear contrast though they were published before Dumont's work in response to earlier proponents of the position Dumont exemplifies. Berreman defines a caste system without regard to ideology: "a *hierarchy of endogamous divisions in which membership is hereditary and permanent*" (3, p. 120), but his attention to the role of ideology is nevertheless direct. Responding to views like Dumont's which distinguish nonconflictful and acceptant attitudes toward caste in India from less acceptance of race relations in the United States, he says:

Central to these distinctions is that caste in India is passively accepted and indorsed by all on the basis of the religio-philosophical explanations which are universally subscribed to, while Negro-white relations in America are characterized by dissent, resentment, guilt and conflict. But this contrast is invalid, resulting, as it does, from an idealized and unrealistic view of Indian caste, contrasted with a more realistic, pragmatic view of American race relations; Indian caste is viewed as it is supposed to work rather than as it does work; American race relations are seen as they do work rather than as they are supposed, by the privileged, to work. The traditional white southerner, asked to describe relations between the races, will describe the Negro as happy in his place, which he may quote science and Scripture to justify. This is similar to the explanations offered for the Indian system by the advantaged (3, p. 121).

Thus, Berreman challenges Dumont's implicit assumption that Hindu caste ideology is monolithic; and his challenge is consistent with the accumulating evidence that the rhetoric of caste ideology is no more a reliable guide to Hindu behavior than the rhetoric of egalitarian ideology is a guide to American behavior. It may still be that Hindu caste ideology is a better approximation to Hindu behavior than American ideology is to American behavior, but this is a subtle comparative question, a question of degree, that has not yet been successfully conceptualized, let alone researched.

The relevant facts in this behavioral attack on the uniqueness of the caste system may be divided into three types. First, there is the actual mobility of entire castes within local hierarchies and the accommodation of the ideology to this relaxation of preordained rigidity. This phenomenon is reported by many and elucidated by Srinivas under the master concept Sanskritization (50, 51). As Srinivas has pointed out, the strength of the caste system as a system of stratification is that it co-opts the dissident group into using the rhetoric of the system in its demands for mobility, thereby yielding rank to those who forcefully support the intricacies of the rank system (50). This highly intellectual exercise in social redefinition does not obviate the fact of mobility and its inconsistency with the basic tenets of caste ideology.

Second, there are many reports of success in avoiding the rigid prescriptions of occupational specialization, especially those involved in the *jajmani* system under which service castes in rural areas perform services in return for annual payment from farmers' crops. Orans (37), in a study of 40 villages, tries to show that the ideology of caste seldom holds individuals to traditional *jajmani* relations if there are viable economic alternatives within reach. Epstein's (16) blacksmith who finds a relative to take his traditional obligations and traditional compensation so that he can be freed to pursue commercial dealings on the open market is another example of the "flexibility" of the system. It is important to note that Epstein's blacksmith, like many lower caste individuals whose occupation is set by their birth into a caste, is a part-time farmer. In fact, empirical studies show that many service caste members own land. Thus, while caste membership is a virtually absolute and enduring ascribed characteristic of individuals seen in terms of the belief system, it is not an adequate index of socioeconomic rank in general. In this situation it is hard to believe that Indian villagers are oblivious to other systems of rank, especially economic rank.

Finally, close study of behavior under caste ideology reveals practical transformations of the overarching ideology of purity and pollution in contexts where human interaction takes place across caste lines. Food exchange and pipe smoking practices described by Dumont (15, pp. 86–87, based on A. C. Mayer's data) indicate that Indian villagers behave in only very approximate accordance with the concept of society provided by caste ideology.

In sum, while caste is clearly the dominant rhetoric for conceptualizing social relations for some Indians, the evidence suggests that it is neither a universally accepted ideological charter for actual relationships, nor a reliable guide to behavioral practice. It can hardly be denied that it is different in content from other ideologies, but how that difference affects experience and practice in India is an unresolved question. Differences in experience and behavior are clearly not as extreme as differences in ideologies.

OSSOWSKI In his seminal work, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness* (38), Ossowski, a Polish sociologist writing in the 1950s, provides a useful counterpoint to the positions reviewed above. His work covers a broad range of Western thinkers on stratification, but his pivotal empirical observation is that ideologists in both the United States and the Soviet Union see their own society as one characterized by "non-egalitarian classlessness." Each sees substantial differences between people in the social and economic rewards they receive, and each concludes that these differences do not constitute classes in his/her society. Thus, allowing for differences in political expression between the societies, Ossowski finds the arguments of Soviet and American ideologists and sociologists about their own societies to be very similar. At the same time, Soviet emigres and American observers see classes in Soviet society, while Soviet observers see classes in American society.

These observations of the way people think and talk about stratification lead Ossowski to the conclusion that:

Interpretations of class structure are social facts, which constitute a response to emergence or persistence of certain types of human relationships. Thus, the typology of the modes of interpreting such structures may be correlated with the typology of the actual structures (38, p. 172).

In establishing his types of correlation between interpretations and actual structures Ossowski separates: A. the beliefs and milieux of the analyst, B. the interpretation of the society, and C. the actual structure of the society. B is the ideology. A is used to explain which particular B is used to view C.

The common sense appeal of this scheme and Ossowski's convincing discussion of historical cases notwithstanding, the problems of infinite regress inherent in any scheme which can be applied to itself become apparent. Is C knowable without B? In fact, is even A knowable without B? But, of course, B is a function of A and C.

Ossowski solves this problem with the implicit assertion that it is nonetheless possible to make meaningful statements about the relation of interpretations to

actual structures. This position is consistent with his treading the thin line between Marxist emphasis on historical specificity and commitment to the importance of generalizing across social systems. From the outset he asserts that ideology is important because: "A view of the social structure which is widely held is an element in the social situation, and thus exerts an influence on the nature of human relations" (38, p. 6).

DAHRENDORF Dahrendorf's display of synthetizing virtuosity in his paper "On the Origins of Inequality among Men" (12) offers the best theoretical orientation which encompasses the various positions reviewed above. He views a normative order as essential to the functioning of a community, but sees it as imposed by those in power (those in power being those who are able to impose a normative order) and inevitably subject to dispute by those who the prevailing order relegates to low positions in the stratification system. From Dahrendorf's point of view, both a prevailing normative order (ideology) and change in the prevailing normative order are basic parts of social reality. The normative order guides the application of sanctions to deviants, and deviants are inevitably produced by the system of stratification headed by those who define the normative order to their own advantage.

CONCLUSIONS Two general conclusions follow from the material reviewed above. First, it is not appropriate to treat ideology as a set of rules from which behavior can be predicted. The relation of norms to behavior is not a simple isomorphic one, even with an ample allowance for "deviant" behavior which does not conform to norms and is sanctioned according to a subsidiary set of rules. Second, it is not appropriate, in the absence of extensive empirical research yielding positive results, to assume that ideology is part of mental culture or cognitive orientation shared by all or most members of a society. In fact, at a more specific level, there is reason to believe that people in advantaged positions in a society will articulate an ideology which implies shared norms supporting the extant social relationships, while people in disadvantaged positions in a society will hold contrary views about the nature of society.

What remains of the action framework after the observation that ideology varies with social position and social purposes? Certainly the commonplace fact that people "feel" constrained by rules and state rules in justification of behavior is not obviated by this observation. What is lost is the principle that generally shared meaning precedes specific meaning. In terms of the contrasts between group-oriented and individual-oriented theories of society stated at the beginning of this section of the paper, this means a rejection of the group-oriented theories insofar as they assume simple ideological homogeneity. It does not imply support for the individual-oriented theories. For investigators of social stratification, at least, the implication seems to be simply that ideology and meaning are relative to position in the stratification system. This is neither a group nor an individual characteristic, and the analysis of action, ideology, and behavior that follows from this fact supercedes the simplistic notions with which I began.

These conclusions to which the study of social stratification have led are not new in this generation of anthropological thought. They are consistent with: 1. the doubts about intracultural cognitive uniformity expressed by Wallace (60); 2. the proposal for study of intracultural diversity by Pelto & Pelto (40); and 3. the war on mentalism led by Harris (23). Moreover, they fit with the new directions advocated by sociologists working on ethnomethodology, labeling theory, and social construction of reality (9, 43); and finally, they are consistent with the increasingly popular conflict views of society and history taken by Marxist and non-Marxist anthropologists. While it is not clear if and when we will reach another dominant consensus of the order of the Parsonian view in sociology and the cultural uniformity-cultural determinist view in anthropology, it is clear that these paradigms can no longer guide study of the role of experience and ideology in social stratification.

The Uses of Ambiguity: Experience and Ideology Continued.

The lively discussion in symbolic anthropology of the ambiguity, multivocality, and manipulability of symbols has as its counterpart in the study of social stratification the attention to the existence and functions of ambiguity. Moore (34) and Turner (59), who bridge symbolic and political anthropology, note how these characteristics of symbols are useful in political action. They are likewise an important characteristic of social stratification systems, for the ability to redefine and manipulate relative rank can transform the experience of social stratification. Whatever the ultimate practical significance of such transformations, they are clearly a frequent feature of behavior in stratification systems. Here I will first review some interpretations of stratification systems which emphasize ambiguity, then discuss the relationship of the scientific mode of inquiry to the study of these phenomena. While the issues discussed below are closely related to those discussed immediately above, I have chosen to separate them because I do not want to confuse the debate about the direct relation of ideology and behavior with the more recently popular discussion of the existence and functions of ambiguity.

For the purposes of discussion it is useful to distinguish three components of the role of ambiguity in the system of stratification. First, ambiguity in cultural conventions, in the roles and the symbols associated with rank, exists in many if not all societies. Where populations of individuals or groups interact as relevant alters there seem to be many rules for specifying rank and many interpretations of the symbols of rank. More are available than are used. The way in which any concrete situation will be defined in terms of the available array of rules and symbols is difficult to know. Second, people or groups vying for rank in any concrete situation will attempt to apply the conventions that enhance their rank. Third, any "resultant" situation may include several different definitions of social reality and remain viable. Normative or cultural consensus need not be characteristic of the situation. In the three examples cited below, the contrast between Leach's early recognition of these characteristics of conventions surrounding stratification and Srinivas's later statement illustrates the way in which

the overall orientation has shifted away from the framework presuming normative (cultural) consensus.

Leach's classic statement in *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (28) 20 years ago comes out of an earlier conception of the relation of ideology and behavior, but includes a clear statement of the functions of ambiguity. He begins:

To be frank, Kachin *gumsa* theory about class differences is almost totally inconsistent with Kachin practice. I want then to explain not only what the Kachin theory is but also how the inconsistencies in actual behavior affect the total social structure.

In theory rank depends strictly upon birth status; all legal rules are framed as if the hierarchy of aristocrats, commoners and slaves had a caste-like rigidity and exclusiveness. In Kachin theory rank is an attribute of lineage and every individual acquires his rank once and for all through the lineage into which he happens to be born. It is easy to see that this theory is a fiction, but less easy to understand just what kind of fiction is involved (28, pp. 159–60).

Leach goes on to show how individuals strive for higher rank by garbling evidence and otherwise manipulating the complicated Kachin rules of succession to optimize the position of their lineage and thereby their own position. "These elaborate rules not only allow for much controversy, they also make it relatively easy for any influential aristocrat to reconstruct remote sections of his geneology in his own favor" (28, p. 166). Leach clearly identifies the functions of ambiguity but, in keeping with the dominant orientation of normative (cultural) consensus when he wrote, takes "Kachin theory" seriously, and thus sees the functions of ambiguity as extraordinary.

Srinivas, writing more recently, has shown how Hindu caste, the most elaborated, hierarchical, and rigid of ideologies, is subject to the same type of manipulation in practice.

Thus the Harijan Holeyas are able to point to the Smiths as their inferiors, and as "evidence" of their superiority, to the fact that they do not accept food and drinking water from Smiths. . . . On their side, the Smiths would dismiss the Harijan claim as absurd, and point to their Sanskritized style of life, and to their not accepting food cooked by any except Brahmins and Lingayats as evidence of their high status. This kind of ambiguity regarding the position of several castes was not only a function of the flexibility of the system but also facilitated its acceptance (52, p. 73).

Hodge, an American sociologist working with traditional quantitative data on education, occupation, and income of individuals, finds the correlation between the types of rank low enough to conclude that the system is not "crystallized" and makes a parallel interpretation for the American system which has one of the most elaborately antihierarchical of modern ideologies.

The absence of a crystallized status system in which education, occupational prestige, and income are so closely interwoven that any one of them may be utilized as a surrogate for the others implies that the vast majority of individuals will have some legitimate claim upon the various rewards of the society (25, p. 183).

All these statements affirm the importance of ambiguity as a part of social reality, and none ultimately confuses it with (a) a deficiency in understanding of the system, or (b) an imperfection in the fit between ideology and behavior. They are consistent with the emphasis on the ambiguity of the symbolic-ideological aspect of social reality that is characteristic of recent and current symbolic anthropology, and inconsistent with earlier views that emphasized the logical coherence and primacy of ideology in meaningful human behavior.

This earlier view in the Durkheimian-Parsonian tradition, it seems to me, came out of a pressure for isomorphism between the clarity, coherence, and order of scientific study and the character of the social reality studied. More recently a similar kind of pressure has led to an implicit isomorphism between complicated social reality and the complicated humanistic approaches to its study. Both are based on the incorrect premise that fuller knowledge is attainable when the form of knowing approximates the form of the known. The premise itself perhaps stems from the hope that fairly complete and objective knowledge is possible.

The genuine ambiguity which exists in social reality, like the disparity which exists between the ideology of high and low ranking people and groups in stratification systems, seems to contribute to the ability of many to live in systems that would seem tolerable to only a few.

CONCLUSIONS

Important insights derived from the study of other societies have accumulated over the years, yet anthropological study of social stratification remains in its infancy. This is particularly true of our understanding of agrarian (peasant) societies, but it is also reflected in the recent revolution in thinking about hunting and gathering societies. While exceptions abound and present trends may be cyclical variation rather than unidirectional progress, growth in the anthropological study of social stratification seems to be part of a movement away from emphasis on the isolation, homogeneity, and uniqueness of other societies and towards their comparability with industrial societies.

The older antiquarian emphasis of anthropology encouraged conceptualization in terms of implicit differences between our sociocultural system and that of anthropological societies. And the older conception of culture emphasized descriptions of autonomous cultural systems in terms of paradigms dominated by a value on coherence and completeness.

This is changing as the ambiguity of symbols and rules is increasingly recognized, and as "norms" become "ideology" and "ideology" becomes "rhetoric" in the standard conceptual tool kit. It changes further as conflict, disarray, incompleteness, and revolution become aspects of social reality rather than signs of scientific inadequacy, and as the recognition of differentiation and change in other societies makes them similar to our vision of ourselves.

The study of social stratification, by its very nature, involves the conceptualization of differences among individuals and groups within a single system of

analysis. And the substance of social stratification, freed of the assumptions of cultural homogeneity and ideological dominance, involves conflict and continuing change in social reality.

DISCLAIMERS

The disclaimers and accompanying rationalizations in a paper of this sort could themselves fill a substantial part of the space available. I want to make them brief and to distinguish motivated exclusions from exclusions resultant from lack of space, time, or competence. I am sorry about the latter category, and hope that others will fill out the picture.

The context of this paper includes theories of society that anthropologists share with sociologists, but I have not attempted to review recent American sociology because the literature is enormous and because I believe Beteille is fundamentally correct when he says, "The poverty of their approach derives from an obsessive concern for 'methodology' and scientific precision at the expense of sociologically significant problems" (4, p. 10).

I have tried to avoid "political anthropology" as such because it is too large a field to handle, and because it has an orientation that concentrates on the upper ranks and getting things done at the societal level. I am concerned with issues better viewed without emphasis on the top.

I have not tried to systematically review Marxist approaches, quasi-Marxist approaches, and non-Marxist approaches that emphasize relations of local systems with the larger system, especially the nation-state and the international politico-economic system, both because the literature has become too large and because I believe they draw needed attention away from internal differentiation in small communities.

I have excluded contributions by prehistorians and primatologists because I am not competent to review them, and studies of sex and ethnic stratification because they are special cases of general principles and because they are currently popular and warrant separate reviews.

Finally, with great regret, I have excluded reviews clustered around a limited number of institutional complexes which I had hoped to include. Caste, the potlatch, the big man system, intentional communities, etc, viewed as stratification systems would produce very useful theoretical insights, I think, as well as valuable intellectual histories of anthropological contributions to social theory.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to Francesa Cancian for very useful comments on various drafts of this paper, and to George Collier, Jane Collier, Bridget O'Laughlin, G. William Skinner, and Katherine Verdery for helpful suggestions.

Literature Cited

1. Adams, R. N. 1970. Brokers and career mobility systems in the structure of complex societies. *Southwest. J. Anthropol.* 26:315-27
2. Benedict, B. 1970. Pluralism and stratification. In *Essays in Comparative Social Stratification*, ed. L. Plotnicov, A. Tuden, 29-41. Univ. Pittsburgh Press. 349 pp.
3. Berreman, G. D. 1960. Caste in India and the United States. *Am. J. Sociol.* 66:120-27
4. Beteille, A. 1969. Introduction. In *Social Inequality: Selected Readings*, ed. A. Beteille, 9-14. Baltimore: Penguin. 397 pp.
5. Boserup, E. 1965. *The Conditions of Agricultural Growth*. Chicago: Aldine. 124 pp.
6. Cancian, F. 1965. *Economics and Prestige in a Maya Community*. Stanford Univ. Press. 238 pp.
7. Cancian, F. 1966. Maximization as norm, strategy, and theory. *Am. Anthropol.* 68:465-70
8. Cancian, F. 1972. *Change and Uncertainty in a Peasant Economy*. Stanford Univ. Press. 208 pp.
9. Cancian, F. M. 1975. *What Are Norms?* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 212 pp.
10. Collier, G. A. 1975. *Fields of the Tzotzil*. Austin: Univ. Texas Press. 255 pp.
11. Dahrendorf, R. 1966. Review symposium on Lenski's power and privilege. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 31:714-18
12. Dahrendorf, R. 1968. On the origin of inequality among men. In *Essays in the Theory of Society*, 151-78. Stanford Univ. Press. 300 pp.
13. DeWalt, B. 1975. Inequalities in wealth, adoption of technology, and production in a Mexican ejido. *Am. Ethnol.* 2:149-68
14. Dumont, L. 1960. Caste, racism and "stratification." In *Social Inequality*, ed. A. Beteille, 337-61. Baltimore: Penguin. 397 pp.
15. Dumont, L. 1970. *Homo Hierarchicus*. Univ. Chicago Press. 386 pp.
16. Epstein, S. 1967. Productive efficiency and customary systems of rewards in rural South India. In *Themes in Economic Anthropology*, ed. R. Firth, 229-52. London: Tavistock. 292 pp.
17. Fallers, L. A. 1973. *Inequality: Social Stratification Reconsidered*. Univ. Chicago Press. 330 pp.
18. Foster, G. M. 1960-61. Interpersonal relations in peasant society. *Hum. Organ.* 19:174-84
19. Fried, M. H. 1967. *The Evolution of Political Society*. New York: Random House. 270 pp.
20. Goody, J. 1971. Class and marriage in Africa and Eurasia. *Am. J. Sociol.* 76:585-603
21. Harris, M. 1959. The economy has no surplus? *Am. Anthropol.* 61:185-99
22. Harris, M. 1966. The cultural ecology of India's sacred cattle. *Curr. Anthropol.* 7:51-66
23. Harris, M. 1974. Why a perfect knowledge of all the rules one must know to act like a native cannot lead to knowledge of how natives act. *J. Anthropol. Res.* 30:242-51
24. Harris, M. 1975. *Culture, People, Nature*. New York: Crowell. 694 pp.
25. Hodge, R. W. 1970. Social integration, psychological well-being, and their socioeconomic correlates. In *Social Stratification: Research and Theory for the 1970s*, ed. E. O. Laumann, 182-206. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 280 pp.
26. Kelley, J., Perlman, M. L. 1971. Social mobility in Toro. *Econ. Dev. Cult. Change* 19:204-21
27. Kerckhoff, A. C. 1974. Stratification processes and outcomes in England and the U.S. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 39:789-801
28. Leach, E. 1954. *Political Systems of Highland Burma*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 324 pp.
29. Lee, R. B., DeVore, I., eds. 1968. *Man the Hunter*. Chicago: Aldine. 415 pp.
30. Leeds, A. 1973. Locality power in relation to supralocal power institutions. In *Urban Anthropology*, ed. A. Southall, 15-41. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 489 pp.
31. Leeds, A., Vayda, A. P., eds. 1965. *Man, Culture, and Animals*. Washington DC: Am. Assoc. Advan. Sci., Vol. 78. 304 pp.
32. Lenski, G. 1966. *Power and Privilege*. New York: McGraw-Hill. 495 pp.
33. Mandel, E. 1968. *Marxist Economic Theory*, Vol. 1. New York: Monthly Review Press. 379 pp.
34. Moore, S. F. 1975. Epilogue: Uncertainties in situations, indeterminacies in culture. In *Symbols*

- and *Politics in Communal Ideology*, ed. S. F. Moore, B. G. Myerhoff. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press. 245 pp.
35. O'Laughlin, B. 1975. Marxist approaches in anthropology. *Ann. Rev. Anthropol.* 4:341-70
 36. Orans, M. 1966. Surplus. *Hum. Organ.* 25:24-32
 37. Orans, M. 1968. Maximizing in jajmaniland. *Am. Anthropol.* 70: 875-97
 38. Ossowski, S. 1963. *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*. New York: Free Press. 202 pp.
 39. Pearson, H. J. 1957. The economy has no surplus. In *Trade and Markets in the Early Empires*, ed. K. Polanyi, C. M. Arensberg, H. W. Pearson, 320-41. Glencoe: Free Press. 382 pp.
 40. Peltó, P. J., Peltó, G. H. 1975. Intra-cultural diversity. *Am. Ethnol.* 2:1-18
 41. Piddocke, S. 1965. The potlatch system of the Southern Kwakiutl. *Southwest J. Anthropol.* 21:244-64
 42. Plotnicov, L., Tuden, A. 1970. Introduction. In *Essays in Comparative Social Stratification*, ed. L. Plotnicov, A. Tuden, 3-25. Univ. Pittsburgh Press. 349 pp.
 43. Rubington, E., Weinberg, M. S. 1968. *Deviance: The Interactionist Perspective*. New York: Macmillan. 422 pp.
 44. Sahlins, M. D. 1958. *Social Stratification in Polynesia*. Seattle: Univ. Washington Press. 306 pp.
 45. Sahlins, M. 1972. *Stone Age Economics*. Chicago: Aldine. 348 pp.
 46. Silverman, S. F. 1965. Patronage and community-nation relationships in central Italy. *Ethnology* 4:172-89
 47. Silverman, S. F. 1966. An ethnographic approach to social stratification. *Am. Anthropol.* 68: 899-921
 48. Skinner, G. W. 1964-65. Marketing and social structure in rural China, Parts, I, II, and III. *J. Asian Stud.* 24:3-43, 195-228, 363-99
 49. Smith, C. A. 1975. Examining stratification systems through peasant marketing arrangements. *Man* n.s. 10:95-122
 50. Srinivas, M. N. 1952. *Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India*. Oxford: Clarendon. 267 pp.
 51. Srinivas, M. N. 1956. A note on Sanskritization and Westernization. *Far Eastern Q.* 15:481-96
 52. Srinivas, M. N. 1975. The Indian village, myth and reality. In *Studies in Social Anthropology*, ed. H. H. Beattie, R. G. Lienhardt, 41-85. Oxford Univ. Press
 53. Stauder, J. 1972. Anarchy and ecology: Political society among the Majangir. *Southwest. J. Anthropol.* 28:153-68
 54. Stavenhagen, R. 1975. *Social Classes in Agrarian Societies*. Garden City: Anchor. 266 pp.
 55. Stevenson, R. F. 1968. *Population and Political Systems in Tropical Africa*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 306 pp.
 56. Thompson, R. A. 1974. *The Winds of Tomorrow: Social Change in a Maya Town*. Univ. Chicago Press. 182 pp.
 57. Treiman, D. J. 1975. Problems of concept measurement in the comparative study of occupational mobility. *Soc. Sci. Res.* 4:183-230
 58. Tuden, A., Plotnicov, L. 1970. Introduction. In *Social Stratification in Africa*, ed. A. Tuden, L. Plotnicov, 1-29. New York: Free Press. 392 pp.
 59. Turner, V. 1975. Symbolic studies. See Ref. 35, 145-61
 60. Wallace, A. F. C. 1961. *Culture and Personality*. New York: Random House. 213 pp.
 61. Wallerstein, I. 1974. *The Modern World System*. New York: Academic. 410 pp.
 62. Wolf, E. R. 1955. Types of Latin American peasantry. *Am. Anthropol.* 57:452-71
 63. Wolf, E. R. 1956. Aspects of group relations in a complex society. *Am. Anthropol.* 58:1065-78
 64. Wolf, E. R. 1967. Levels of communal relations. In *Handbook of Middle American Indians*, gen. ed., R. Wauchope, vol. ed., M. Nash, 6:299-316. Austin: Univ. Texas Press