

Regionalism in World Politics

REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND
INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Edited by

LOUISE FAWCETT

and

ANDREW HURRELL

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

5

The Growth of Regional Organizations and the Role of the United Nations

Alan K. Henrikson

THE United Nations, particularly the Security Council, has reasserted itself as the 'nerve-centre' of international decision-making in the field of peace and security.¹ However, the changes that took place during the Cold War probably will preclude any recentralization of world authority as conceived by some universalists at the time of the 1945 San Francisco Conference. An entirely new inter-organizational 'balance' will have to be struck between the UN Organization and what were then called by some 'regional councils'.² The novel possibility today is that *both* the universal body—the United Nations—and the regional institutions that have come into existence will become stronger and gain in acceptability as producers of international peace and security. The stock of both kinds of multilateral enterprise has risen more or less simultaneously as superpower unilateralism has declined. In consequence, the UN, on the one hand, and regional groupings, on the other, are no longer so likely to be regarded as rivals, or even

as alternatives to one another, in international decisions for peace and security. They may come to work together in partnership.

Regional arrangements or agencies—the ones generally recognized as such by the UN community—include the Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS), and, more recently, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and also the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The UN and these various regional entities increasingly may be viewed as parts of the same overall assemblage of institutions. Even regionally centred pacts for mutual defence, not traditionally thought of by the UN as regional bodies, particularly the Western European Union (WEU), founded on the 1948 Brussels Treaty, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established on the basis of the 1949 Washington Treaty, are becoming friends of the world institution. As will be seen, they are becoming less alliance-like and more 'multilateral' organizations.

The ill-feeling of the Cold War years is surrendering to a new tolerance, even appreciation, on the part of the UN of what regional institutions of all kinds might be able to do. 'For dealing with new kinds of security challenges, regional arrangements or agencies can render assistance of great value', as Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar stated in his 1990 report to UN members. 'This presupposes the existence of the relationship between the UN and regional arrangements envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter. The defusion of tensions between states and the pacific settlement of local disputes are, in many cases, matters appropriate for regional action.' Though qualified by the important 'proviso' that the efforts of regional agencies 'should be in harmony with those of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter', Pérez de Cuéllar's observation suggested the possible transition to a new era, a period of global-regional balance and comity.³ This chapter addresses a central question: what are the prospects for inter-organizational co-operation in the field of peace and security, for what Tommy Koh has called a 'new partnership' between regional

¹ The 'nerve-centre' image, implying a quasi-organic system of communication and decision, is that of R. A. Akindele in *The Organization and Promotion of World Peace: A Study of Universal-Regional Relationships* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. xii.

² The principal Second World War proponent of 'regional councils' was Winston Churchill, who reasoned that only those countries directly affected by a dispute 'could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement'. To be sure, Churchill also favoured a 'Supreme World Council' which would have 'the last word': Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, iv, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 802-7. Most Latin American governments were unwilling to subject their existing system of international co-operation within the western hemisphere to possible veto action by the great powers within a centralized UN Security Council and therefore strongly defended the regional principle. See Ruth B. Russell, assisted by Jeanette E. Muther, *A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940-1945* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1958), 688-712.

³ Quoted in Benjamin Rivlin, 'Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective Security and Conflict Resolution: A New Road Ahead?', *International Relations*, 11/2 (Aug. 1992), 97.

and subregional organizations on the one hand and the UN on the other.⁴

The traditional obstacle to co-operation between the UN and 'regional arrangements or agencies', as they are termed in Article 52(1) of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, has been the basic issue of the primacy of the one or the other. This general question of rank can be expressed in several ways. First, there is the issue of which has *priority*—that is, which is the initial recourse, has the right of regard, takes logical precedence, and, in general, is expected to come first. A second is the issue of *supremacy*—that is, which is higher in terms of legal, political, and moral authority or status, and thus can bestow more legitimacy, implying greater international acceptability. A third is the issue of their relative *ascendancy*—that is, which tends to predominate, actually possessing more power and influence, and thus is able to accomplish more.

A different axis of analysis concerns what might generally be termed the personality of organizations. The first issue concerns the organization's *individuality* or separateness of identity—that is, how distinct is it in membership and purpose, organizational type and style, or current policy and activity. A second question is the degree of the organization's *autonomy*—that is, how sufficient and self-directing is it, or independent of other organizations (or major individual countries), in terms of initiative and direction. A third question concerns the organization's *capability*—that is, how resourceful, competent, and effective is it in solving problems in comparison with other international organizations. The weight of this chapter will be placed more on the attributes of organizational personality rather than on the formal or other indicia of institutional primacy. The vital question is whether the UN and regional organizations are sufficiently alike to be able to work together and not whether in some sense (precedence, authority, or power) the global or the regional organization is 'above' or 'below' the other.

In the sections that follow, I shall first set out the existing constitutional relationships between the UN and regional arrangements and agencies. Next I shall relate the main lines of the history of

global-regional relations in international peacemaking.⁵ This historical foundation is intended to establish the pattern of global-regional relations from the Second World War through the Cold War years. This is followed with a more detailed consideration of leading recent cases of peacemaking which have increasingly come to involve both the UN and regional organizations. These highlight the central argument of the chapter: *that at least some UN action is always necessary, if not to elicit regional-organizational efforts then to make them more fully accepted and effective; yet, without direct and deep regional involvement, international peacemaking is likely to lack continuity and consistency.* The chapter then analyses current proposals for improving global-regional co-operation, including, most notably, the relevant recommendations of *An Agenda for Peace*.⁶ Finally, the chapter offers a comprehensive rationale for a new global-regional 'system' or practical partnership in international peacemaking.

1. THE UN CHARTER AND 'REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS OR AGENCIES': LEGAL MANDATES AND INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The bedrock is Chapter VIII on Regional Arrangements. This records an international consensus regarding the global-regional problem that was formulated, though not fully worked out substantively, at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in late 1944 and the San Francisco Conference on International Organization early the next year. The new United Nations was intended to be the paramount institution, having supremacy over all others. 'In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations

⁵ Peacemaking is defined here, inclusively, to mean most kinds of international action for peace and security from military peace-enforcement through peacekeeping operations to pacific settlement via diplomacy. In current UN parlance, 'peacemaking' is defined, more narrowly, to refer to international action to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means—specifically those outlined in Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) of the Charter. However, in contemporary journalistic usage, the word sometimes is contradistinguished with 'peacekeeping,' thus suggesting pacification by the use of military force.

⁶ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, repr. in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World* (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn., 1993).

⁴ Tommy Koh, 'Summary and Conclusion,' *The Singapore Symposium: The Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace-keeping*, 13-15 Mar. 1991 (New York: United Nations, 1991), 82.

under any other international agreement', Article 103 unequivocally states, 'their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.'⁷ None the less, three 'fundamental concessions', as they have been characterized, were made to the idea of regionalism and regional peacemaking. The essential purpose of these provisions of the Charter was to give a regional entity the 'elbow-room' it needed in order to deal with local disputes, as the institutional forum of first instance.⁸ Part of the Charter authors' thinking was that regional organizations might serve as a buffer—making it less necessary for the UN itself to deal with local problems.

The first so-called concession, stated in Article 33(1) of Chapter VI on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, is the provision that parties to any dispute endangering international peace and security 'shall, first of all, seek a solution by... resort to regional agencies or arrangements', by direct negotiation, third-party mediation, arbitration, or some other means of their own choosing. In addition, the region-focused Chapter VIII stipulates that nothing in the Charter is to preclude 'the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action' (Article 52(1)). Chapter VIII states that UN members entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall 'make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council' (Article 52(2)). Thus we find evidence of logical or temporal priority being given to regional consideration.

Such regional efforts were actively to be promoted, and employed, by the UN Organization. The Security Council 'shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council', Article 52(3) of Chapter VIII states. But against this, the Charter carefully reserves to the Security Council, in Chapter VI on Pacific Settlement, the Council's independent authority

and also its organizational autonomy in the investigation of all disputes or situations that might threaten peace (Article 34). Moreover, Article 35 assures to any country, even countries that do not belong to the UN, the opportunity to come directly to the UN—either the Security Council or the General Assembly—provided such non-members accept the obligations of pacific settlement set forth in the Charter. The scope of the UN's willingness to act for peace was thus in principle universal. None the less, overall the priority accorded to regional organizations in dispute settlement is clear.

The second concession to regionalism is the allowance made in the Charter for the continued operation of existing mutual assistance pacts—perhaps most significantly, the 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance against Nazi Germany and its European associates. Article 53(1) of Chapter VIII declares pointedly that measures against 'enemy states', defined in Article 53(2) as those that during the Second World War had been enemies of any Charter signatory, could be taken immediately, without prior authorization of the Security Council. These actions could continue until the UN itself assumed responsibility on the request of the government involved. Article 53(1) makes clear that these exceptional measures of enforcement against former enemy states might result from 'regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state'. Chapter XVII on Transitional Security Arrangements similarly carries over the authority of the victors of the Second World War into the unsettled postwar situation. Pending the coming into force of 'special agreements' between the Security Council and UN members or groups of members to make available to the Organization armed forces, assistance, and facilities provided for in Chapter VIII, Article 43, the Four-Power Declaration signed in Moscow in October 1943 would remain in effect. Under this agreement, the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the UK, and the USA could, with the addition of France, consult with one another and other UN members with a view to 'such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security' (Article 106).

The third and most important concession to regionalism is the recognition of Article 51 at the end of Chapter VII on Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression of 'the inherent right of individual or collective self-

⁷ The text of the UN Charter is reprinted in Roberts and Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World*.

⁸ Francis O. Wilcox, 'Regionalism and the United Nations', in Norman J. Padelford and Leland M. Goodrich (eds.), *The United Nations in the Balance: Accomplishments and Prospects* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 427.

defence'. This right, which as 'inherent' was natural or inalienable, could be exercised regionally. Article 51 usually has been understood to allow for treaties of mutual assistance for the purpose of collective defence—that is, alliances. There is no reason why these defensive pacts could not be among the 'regional arrangements' referred to in Article 52 at the beginning of Chapter VII. Article 53(1) of that chapter contains the otherwise limiting (except for the right of self-defence assured in Article 51) provision that the Security Council 'shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority'. It further stipulates that, except for anti-enemy state measures, which would be virtually automatic, 'no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council'. Yet regional groups constituted as alliances, using Article 51, could not be so constrained.⁹ The early examples of regionally based, though not formally 'regional', mutual defence pacts were the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance completed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, The Brussels Pact of 1948 focused on Western Europe, and the Washington Treaty of 1949 which was transatlantic in strategic scope.¹⁰ All of these agreements for common defence refer to Article 51, and thus can be said to avoid the restraints on 'regional arrangements or agencies' in Chapter VIII, and perhaps even the more general limitations imposed by the Charter on the resort to force by UN members.¹¹

⁹ This reasoning, emphasizing the autonomy of 'Article 51' organizations, follows Hans Kelsen, *The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems* (London: Stevens & Sons, 1950), 792–7.

¹⁰ Both US Secretary of State Dean Acheson and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin made statements to the effect that the arrangement based on the North Atlantic Treaty was not an regional organization within the meaning of Art. 52 in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Ambassador E. N. van Kieffens, the Dutch representative to the USA, did evidently consider the Atlantic Pact to be a regional arrangement, however. See his 'Regionalism and Political Pacts with Special Reference to the North Atlantic Treaty', *American Journal of International Law*, 43 (1949), 666–78. From the Soviet perspective, the Atlantic Pact was an illegitimate 'conspiracy' against the UN Charter. The USSR already had a comparable network of defensive arrangements of its own, of course. See Boleslaw Adam Boczek, 'The Eastern European Countries and the Birth of the Atlantic Alliance', in Ennio Di Nolfo (ed.), *The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later: A Historical Reappraisal* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 171–3.

¹¹ There should be noted, however, the often-overlooked qualification in Art. 51 that the right of individual or collective self-defence could be exercised 'until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and

The individual UN member's right of self-defence, exercised alone or in concert with other UN members of similar interest and outlook and perhaps in a regional setting, and the prerogative of leadership held by the Security Council for the purpose of preserving international peace and security thus were delicately balanced. Neither, according to the Charter, was unmistakably supreme—or at least clearly dominant. Yet there was no concrete plan for enabling the world and regional organizations to function together and to act jointly. One of the US delegates at San Francisco, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, declared hopefully that 'we have found a sound, a practical formula for putting regional organizations into effective gear with the global institution.' What Vandenberg meant was that Article 51, with its explicit recognition of the right of collective self-defence, permitted the formation of a regionally based inter-American security arrangement, the Rio Treaty, which would preserve America's freedom under the Monroe Doctrine. This US-controlled mechanism could become incorporated into the larger UN system only nominally. The world organization was 'infinitely strengthened' by enlisting 'the dynamic resources of these regional affiliates', Vandenberg asserted. 'We weld these regional king-links into the global chain.'¹²

This loosely constituted dual arrangement was intended by its designers to enable the UN and all present and future regional bodies to function in theoretical if not practical union. Despite the roominess of the Charter structure, there subsequently developed considerable tension, even contention, between the world body and regional entities. As shown, there exist the competing claims of, on the one hand, Articles 33(1) and 52(2), which seem to allow regional organizations priority of action with regard to managing disputes essentially of a 'local' character; and, on the other, Articles 34 and 35 which, together with the powerful general

security', at which point the need for such self-defensive measures, presumably, no longer would exist. The signatories of the San Francisco Charter conferred on the United Nations Organization, specifically the Security Council, 'primary responsibility' for maintaining international peace and security (Art. 24(1)). Furthermore, Art. 39 at the beginning of Chapter VII establishes that it is the Security Council that 'shall determine the existence' of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression, and then 'shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken'.

¹² Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed.), with the collaboration of Joe Alex Morris, *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 366.

Charter authorizations of Articles 24 and 39, appear to give the UN, specifically the Security Council, the pre-eminent role and supremacy if not ascendancy. The vagueness of this division of responsibility between the global organization and regional groupings has conditioned the history of all subsequent dealings between them.

As for regional organizations, because of the strong impression conveyed especially by Chapter VIII that 'regional arrangements or agencies' are to be subordinate to the UN at least in the matter of 'enforcement action', it matters a great deal whether these organizations consider themselves to be Chapter VIII entities or not. The OAS's 1948 Bogotá Charter expressly states that, 'within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a regional agency' (Article 1). The preparatory materials of the Addis Ababa Charter of 1963 indicate that the Organization of African Unity also was intended to be a 'regional arrangement'. The League of Arab States, though established in 1945 shortly before the San Francisco Conference (April-June), none the less clearly was meant by its founders to be a regional part of a global structure.¹³ In July 1992 the forerunner of the OSCE, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), established at Helsinki in 1975, designated itself a regional organization in the sense of Chapter VIII.¹⁴ In March 1994 the successor organization of the Soviet

¹³ Although the UN General Assembly did not acknowledge the Arab League's intended relationship to the United Nations when it invited it to send an observer, the League's own resolutions, and the subsequent actual practice of UN organs, leave little doubt about the League's Chapter VIII orientation. On this issue of the qualification of the OAS, OAU, and Arab League as UN Charter 'regional' bodies, see Ekkli Kourula, 'Peace-keeping and Regional Arrangements', in A. Cassese (ed.), *United Nations Peace-keeping: Legal Essays* (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), 102-6. It might be noted that on three early occasions the General Assembly 'avoided passing judgment' on whether these three organizations were 'arrangements or agencies' in the context of Art. 52 of Chapter VIII. See Akindele, *The Organization and Promotion of World Peace*, 11, citing Leland M. Goodrich, Edward V. Hambro, and Anne P. Simons, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents* (3rd edn., New York: Columbia UP, 1969), 356-7.

¹⁴ During the opening and closing of the 1975 Helsinki Conference itself, the participants were addressed by the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, attending as a guest of honour. The Final Act, though not a treaty and therefore not eligible for registration under Art. 102 of the UN Charter, none the less was transmitted to the Secretary-General for circulation to all UN members as 'an official document of the United Nations': Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act', *The Department of State Bulletin*, 73/188 (1 Sept. 1975), 323-50.

Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, rather surprisingly registered itself as a regional arrangement, winning observer status from the UN General Assembly.

Formalistic and declaratory self-qualification along the lines of the UN Charter's Chapter VIII does not, of course, establish actual working relationships with the world body. The proffered OAS, OAU, LAS, OSCE, and CIS associations with the UN do give them, however, the appearance of consistency with the central organization, a kind of family resemblance to it. They qualify *structurally*, so to speak, to be regional counterparts and potential close associates of the UN. Moreover, as relatively general-purpose formations, often the leading ones within their respective large geographical spheres, they have a presumptive role in maintaining peace and security there, as well as in handling other matters of common regional concern.

A test, although by no means a conclusive one, of whether these and other possible Chapter VIII entities actually do exercise responsibilities in the peace-and-security field in conjunction with the UN is whether they fulfil the reporting requirement of Article 54. This article in Chapter VIII stipulates that, 'at all times', the Security Council is to be 'kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security'.¹⁵ Non-performance of this timely reporting requirement, of course, would not itself prove that the actions taken by regional organizations were at variance with the basic purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It would, however, suggest that the individuality, autonomy, and capability of a regional grouping were such that it felt it could ignore the world organization.

Controversy regarding the compatibility of regional or subregional security structures with the UN Charter has focused mainly on NATO. Similar to it, as alliances or collective-defence schemes, are the WEU, the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Pact, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). Although some of these bodies (viz. SEATO and the WTO) are defunct and others

¹⁵ Art. 51, of the preceding non-regionally related Chapter VII, stipulates that measures taken in exercise of the right of self-defence be 'immediately reported' to the Security Council—after the fact.

(e.g. ANZUS) perhaps moribund, all of these treaty-based security relationships contributed substantially to the Cold War bipolar international order. They had important international stabilizing effects, and in some cases even peacemaking influence. Other, newer regional and subregional formations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), may also serve to promote international order and cannot be ignored in any account of global-regional relationships in the field of peace and security, whatever their formal relationship to the UN.

In addition to the structural, or formal-institutional, criteria that may need to be satisfied by a region-based organization, there can be other, more practical tests. If met, these could *functionally* legitimize regional groups' peacemaking actions. As R. A. Akindele has rightly emphasized, 'relations of a regional organization to the United Nations are determined and defined not by the character of the regional organization, but by the function it is performing at a particular time'.¹⁶ The critical fact is not what the organization is, but what it does. Thereby, UN compatibility can be earned by a regional body.

2. GLOBAL-REGIONAL COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEMAKING: THE EVOLVING HISTORICAL PATTERN

During most of the Cold War period the UN and regional bodies tended to grow apart. Paradoxically, certain regional entities, particularly the alliances, assumed some of the broad security responsibilities of the global body, while the UN itself, though retaining its world-wide mandate, in fact involved itself mostly in local peacekeeping duties. The net effect was to reduce the world's reliance on the UN and to de-emphasize the need for regional organizations to co-ordinate their actions with the UN. 'Rightly or wrongly, the emphasis is less on teamwork and more on independent action'.¹⁷ This shift in the inter-organizational balance had important political and legal consequences. 'The constitutional history of the United Nations shows', wrote Akindele in the mid-1970s, 'that there has been a *de facto* revision of the Charter law of

universal-regional relationships in favour of greater autonomy for regional organizations'.¹⁸

There was during the Cold War, therefore, a kind of cross-over between regionalism and universalism. Some regional organizations, notably NATO, assumed the main responsibility for maintaining international security, almost world-wide.¹⁹ Denied its ostensibly central role by the superpower division within it, the UN assumed, *faute de mieux*, the useful but marginal role of keeping peace whenever cease-fires and truces could be worked out in regions. This was not intended. Peacekeeping was an improvisation of the UN—'discovered, like penicillin'.²⁰ Only during the Korean conflict in 1950 was the UN Security Council, owing to a temporary absence from the Security Council of the Soviet delegate, able to assume its Charter-assigned primary responsibility for peace and security under Chapter VII. Even that exceptional episode, however, was dominated strategically by regional-alliance concerns, including NATO's worry about a possible Russian offensive on the European front.

Chapter VIII-based regional organizations (as distinct from alliances) played a much smaller role than the authors of the Charter had planned. They were not used either as 'shock absorber' or as 'forum of first resort'—at least by the UN Organization. This was not only because of their own weaknesses but also because the proper strength, authority, and credibility of the UN Security Council had not been built up. 'One can only hazard a guess', Wilcox speculates, 'but in all likelihood if the Security Council had been able to discharge effectively its responsibility for the maintenance of peace, many more disputes of a local character would have been settled at the regional level'.²¹

With this suggestion in mind—namely that effective regional

¹⁶ Akindele, *The Organization and Promotion of World Peace*, pp. xi–xii.

¹⁹ On the geographical scope of consultation under the North Atlantic Alliance, see Sir Nicholas Henderson, *The Birth of NATO* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 100–5. On NATO's *de facto* extended influence, see Alan K. Henrikson, 'The North Atlantic Alliance as a Form of World Order', in Alan K. Henrikson (ed.), *Negotiating World Order: The Artisanry and Architecture of Global Diplomacy* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986), 111–35; also Elizabeth Sherwood, *Allies in Crisis: Meeting Global Challenges to Western Security* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1990).

²⁰ Brian Urquhart, 'The United Nations, Collective Security, and International Peacekeeping', in Henrikson (ed.), *Negotiating World Order*, 62.

²¹ Wilcox, 'Regionalism and the United Nations', 431.

dispute-settlement depends on effective UN Security Council peace-making—we can now consider the inherited pattern of global-regional relations in the field of peace and security. The story, alas, is mainly one of inter-organizational competition.

(a) *The Western Hemisphere*

The primordial international-legal formulation of the relationship between the western hemisphere (and indeed all other geopolitical 'regions') and the world organization of the time is Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 'Nothing in this Covenant', that article declares, 'shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.' Principally out of deference to the non-member USA, the Geneva-based League generally stayed out of western hemisphere territorial and other disputes. When both the League and the pan-American system did become involved, as during the Bolivian-Paraguayan conflict over the Gran Chaco, the very 'multiplicity of agencies' was regarded as one cause of the failure of peacemaking.²²

Later, the UN also engaged in contests with the pan-American system. Divergences were partly a function of the inter-American community's sense of its own unique mission, its separate historical personality, but they were also a reflection of the failure of peace-making at the global level. 'Many of the world-wide institutions under the aegis of the United Nations have become only pale shadows of what their founders... expected them to be', as a former OAS Secretary-General from Argentina, Alejandro Orfila, explained. 'In these circumstances, during the Cold War between the two superpowers, the vision of regional order in the Americas gained in attractiveness.'²³ In the western hemisphere the OAS became the organization of choice.

The UN and the OAS engaged in a jurisdictional struggle, in a pattern-setting way, over Guatemala in 1954. The government

²² See Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1948), I, 336; F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 2 vols. (London: OUP, 1952), II, 526.

²³ Alejandro Orfila, 'The Organization of American States and International Order in the Western Hemisphere', in Henrikson (ed.), *Negotiating World Order*, 139.

there under Jacobo Arbenz appealed to both the OAS and the UN in what became, in the words of the President of the Security Council at the time, US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., a 'fundamental question of venue'.²⁴ The Soviet Union, supporting the left-wing Guatemalan government, maintained that the issue was one of 'aggression', rather than a 'local dispute' appropriate for a regional organization, and therefore that action by the Security Council under Article 24 (emphasizing the Security Council's 'primary responsibility') was called for. A compromise course (but in effect favouring the American side) was to argue that regional-organizational consideration took priority (Articles 33(1) and 52(2)) but to assert the unaffected legal authority, or supremacy, of the UN. This was the view that in the end prevailed.²⁵

The regional-universal dilemma—essentially, a choice between power and law—was posed again in the autumn of 1962. Facing the threat of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, the members of the OAS 'recommended' (for that is all its Charter enables the OAS to do) the collective 'quarantine', or blockade, of Cuba. This autonomous action by the OAS, a Chapter VIII regional organization, was questionable. The US government-promoted doctrine of the OAS as a regional surrogate for the United Nations, rather than a mere local-dispute-settlement mechanism, represents probably the greatest inroad of a UN Charter-based regional organization against the primary jurisdiction of the UN in the field of international peace and security.²⁶ Although the USA argued that the American republics had 'primary' responsibility, and a corresponding duty to act, the UN was not ignored; and, in accordance with Article 54 of the UN Charter, the OAS duly forwarded its 'quarantine' resolution to the UN. Yet Secretary-General U Thant left no doubt that he believed the US-OAS naval measures to be organ-

²⁴ UN doc. SCOR/675 of 20 June 1954, 1.

²⁵ Akindele, *The Organization and Promotion of World Peace*, 80–1. See also Brian Urquhart, *Hammarström* (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1972), 92–3.

²⁶ On this question and on US efforts to overcome the suspicion of illegality, see Akindele, *The Organization and Promotion of World Peace*, xii, 110–15; Abram Chayes, 'The Legal Case for the US Action on Cuba', *The Department of State Bulletin*, 47/1221 (Nov. 1962), 763–5. See also Abram Chayes, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the Role of Law* (New York: OUP, 1974); and Dean Rusk, as told to Richard Rusk, *As I Saw It*, ed. Daniel S. Papp (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 232–3.

izationally *ultra vires*, however strategically warranted they might have been.²⁷

The crisis in 1965 in the Dominican Republic very slightly reconciled the two organizations when, for the first time, a hemispheric organization fielded a military unit of its own. As nominally a 'peacekeeping' exercise rather than an 'enforcement' action, the dispatch of the Inter-American Peace Force by the OAS allegedly did not require prior approval by the Security Council (the 'authorization' mandated by Article 53(1)) but only the Security Council's being 'kept fully informed' (Article 54). After this event it would be generally understood that the UN would be able to increase its political involvement in the Americas only if regional action under OAS auspices were to fail.²⁸ UN Secretary-General U Thant, to be sure, did send a representative to the Dominican Republic to seek a cease-fire, observe, and report; and the first real cease-fire in the situation was in fact negotiated by that representative, the Venezuelan diplomat José Mayobre. It historically 'bears mentioning' that, as U Thant noted, the Dominican episode was the first one in which the UN and the OAS acted concurrently, going in 'side by side'.²⁹ The relationship, however, remained strongly competitive.

(b) Africa

The global-regional balance with regard to peace and security in Africa was also tilted heavily in favour of the regional body, the OAU, despite that organization's lack of effectiveness. Its institutional disability for peacemaking purposes is partly a function of independent-Africa's consensus, embodied in the 1963 Addis

²⁷ U Thant, *View from the UN* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1978), 163-4 and 172. The UN Security Council refused a Cuban request that the Council request of the International Court of Justice an advisory opinion regarding, *inter alia*, whether the OAS had the right to take enforcement action against a UN member state without authorization by the Security Council. This refusal was described by Thant as 'a tragedy'. 'By this nonaction the Security Council implicitly endorses "Monroe Doctrines" everywhere on earth', *ibid.* 160 and 173.

²⁸ The US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, expressed the view that 'the purposes of the United Nations Charter will hardly be served if two international organizations are seeking to do things in the same place with the same people at the same time'; UN doc. SPV 1217 of 22 May 1965, 21, quoted in Linda B. Miller, *World Order and Local Disorder: The United Nations and Internal Conflicts* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1967), 159.

²⁹ Thant, *View from the UN*, 371-3.

Ababa Charter establishing the OAU, that the territorial framework of boundaries inherited from the European colonial powers was not to be changed, and partly of the reluctance of outside powers again to become involved there.³⁰ OAU regional diplomacy therefore normally predominated. For example, when hostilities broke out in 1963 between Morocco and Algeria, Morocco's King Hassan II was doubtful that the OAU would take an open-minded approach to his revisionist boundary claims against Algeria and instead brought the matter to the attention of the UN Secretary-General, Algeria, relying on the Addis Ababa Charter, sought OAU mediation. The major Western countries, wishing to avoid entanglement, persuaded the Moroccan monarch to accept regional management of the issue. This finally was resolved in 1972 according to the territorial status quo guideline of the OAU Charter. The Moroccan-Algerian precedent established what has been termed the 'Try OAU First' principle.³¹

The OAU claimed precedence again in 1964 when Somalia, accusing Ethiopia and also Kenya of holding lands it believed were Somali, asked for UN Security Council consideration of its charge of aggression. Other African countries counselled withdrawal of the request and Somalia soon complied, informing the Security Council that it no longer wished to raise the issue 'while the problem is in the hands of the OAU'.³² The pressures of regional conformity were simply too strong. As Akindede comments: 'no African state has adamantly insisted on ignoring the OAU and on having direct access to the world body.' This also then reflected the reluctance of UN members, especially the most powerful states, 'to be drawn into African disputes which were not perceived as raising fundamentally critical issues of global strategic significance'.

³⁰ See Samuel Chime, 'The Organization of African Unity and African Boundaries', in C. G. Widerstrand (ed.), *African Boundary Problems* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1969), 65-79, and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *L'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1969), Art. III of the OAU Charter proclaims 'respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence'.

³¹ Bethanykun Andemicael, 'The Organization of African Unity and the United Nations: Relations in the Peace and Security Field', in Bethanykun Andemicael (ed.), *Regionalism and the United Nations* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: published for UNITAR by Oceana Publications, 1979), 238 and 254-6. Also see Wellington W. Nyangoni, *Africa in the United Nations System* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1985).

³² UN doc. SCOR S/SS42 of 14 Feb. 1964, 65-6.

cance'.³³ Cold War divisions usually precluded the Organization's united action.

The UN did, to be sure, become deeply involved in the civil war in the Congo although this was a somewhat different category of problem, centring not on differences over boundaries but on the basic question of political and administrative control. In 1960, when the Belgian mercenary-assisted breakaway of Katanga Province occurred, the Congolese government urgently requested UN assistance. On the basis of a resolution by the Security Council, UN peacekeeping units and also a Reconciliation Commission were sent.³⁴ The UN wanted to insulate the Congo as much as possible from the risk of great-power intervention and encouraged maximum African participation. The formation of the OAU, in part a response to the Congo crisis, introduced a new regional player in the situation. It tried its best to 'Africanize' the process of bringing of peace to the Congo. An Ad Hoc Commission of ten OAU members under Jomo Kenyatta consulted, but could not prevent, an American-British-Belgian rescue operation that took place in Stanleyville in November 1964. The OAU joined in international requests for a meeting of the UN Security Council to condemn this extra-regional intervention. Ultimately, the Security Council passed a resolution placing the problem of peace promotion in the Congo 'in the lap of the OAU'.³⁵ The UN was not drawn into the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70, because it recognized that the majority of African states supported the Nigerian federal government in Lagos rather than the independence-seeking Biafra.

The OAU, though generally ineffective, did achieve a noteworthy, if minor, success with a peacekeeping operation in Chad during the war of 1981-3. OAU diplomatic and military efforts helped to 'erect a cordon' around that conflict, helping to prevent the collapse of the Chadian state, and underlining the African policy against outside involvement by the former European colonial states, by the superpowers, or even by the UN. 'The OAU fears the

³³ Akindele, *The Organization and Promotion of World Peace*, 96-8.

³⁴ Ralph J. Bunche, 'The United Nations Operation in the Congo', in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds.), *The Quest for Peace: The Dag Hammarskjöld Memorial Lectures* (New York: Columbia UP, 1965), 126. On the juridical position of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), see R. Simmonds, *Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Military Operations in the Congo* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968).

³⁵ Akindele, *The Organization and Promotion of World Peace*, 98-102.

internationalization of African conflicts, and seeks to contain these conflicts within the continental jurisdiction'.³⁶

(c) *The Middle East*

Organized diplomatic contact between regionalism and globalism for peace-and-security purposes in the Middle East has been minimal. A rare early case, showing the difficulty as well as the promise of co-ordinated peacemaking by a regional body and the world organization, concerned Lebanon. In May 1958 that country's President, Camille Chamoun, appealed to the League of Arab States and then also to the UN to put an end to what he considered foreign intervention in his country—armed subversives allegedly backed by the newly combined Egyptian—Syrian United Arab Republic (UAR). Because of the temporal priority of the request to the Arab League, and also because of the view that the regional organization ought to be allowed at least to try to promote peace, the Security Council suspended its own consideration of the issue. Although the Council of the Arab League sought exclusive control of the matter, the Government in Beirut exercised its right under Article 35 to return to the Security Council and it obtained, owing to the Soviet Union's abstention, a neutral Swedish resolution calling for dispatch of what became the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). Because of the intrusion of extra-regional forces (underlined by the pre-emptive landing of US troops in Lebanon), the Arab League had to attempt to regain a measure of regional influence by acting within the UN. Ten Arab governments successfully proposed that the UN General Assembly call upon Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to arrange for an early withdrawal of foreign troops. Arab diplomacy, though not the Arab League *per se*, thus played a critical role, the UN being the context for it.³⁷

Other situations in which there has been some Arab League-United Nations contact, occasionally also through the Arab group at the UN, include the Kuwait-Iraq border dispute of 1961, civil

³⁶ Bamayangay Joseph Massaquoi, 'Conflict Resolution: The OAU and Chad', *Transafrica Forum*, 7/4 (Winter 1990/1), 83-99.

³⁷ Uquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, 261-92; Akindele, *The Organization and Promotion of World Peace*, 89-92; Hussein A. Hassouna, 'The League of Arab States and the United Nations: Relations in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes', in Andemicael (ed.), *Regionalism and the United Nations*, 310.

strife in Yemen in 1962, and, a decade later, a border conflict between North and South Yemen. In dealing with the first of these, which was largely managed by Arab diplomacy, an Arab League Security Force was actually organized and sent. At the time the machinery of the UN Security Council was veto-blocked, and the Arab League's action probably saved Kuwait. In 1976 an even larger Arab peacekeeping force went into Lebanon, which was increasingly beset by the Israeli-Palestinian struggle as well as by its own internal wrangling.³⁸ The UN did not become involved there until March 1978 when it augmented the Syrian-dominated Arab regional force with a more widely gathered UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The interplay of the UN and the Arab League was beginning to become regularized.

(d) Europe

The prime example of peace-and-security action in the European strategic theatre and its environs is, of course, the defence and deterrence offered by NATO. Although US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles made it plain that 'NATO has not been organized as a regional association, nor has it any policy or jurisdiction to deal with disputes as between the members', the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, being a political alliance as well as a military force, actually has exercised a peacemaking influence. In late 1956, following the Suez débâcle, a NATO Committee of Three composed of the foreign ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway recommended that the Alliance improve its consultation capabilities. The NATO member governments reaffirmed their obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means (a UN Charter commitment repeated in Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty). Moreover, they agreed to submit internal disputes among themselves to good-offices procedures *within* their Alliance—'before resorting to any other agency'.³⁹ NATO thus gained organizational priority, if not juridical supremacy, and the UN was scarcely thought of as an alternative.

³⁸ Hassouna, 'The League of Arab States and the United Nations', 319–21.

³⁹ *The Department of State Bulletin*, 34/884 (4 June 1956): 925–6, and 'Non-Military Co-operation in NATO: Text of the Report of the Committee of Three', NATO Letter, 5, special suppl. to no. 1 (1 Jan. 1957), 8, quoted in Wilcox, 'Regionalism and the United Nations', 431–2.

The major historical achievement of regional peacemaking by NATO as an organization surely has been its management of French–German differences, including the Saar dispute. NATO also institutionally mediated the British–Icelandic 'cod war' and moderated the British–Spanish Gibraltar question. The most notable case of inter-organizational pacific diplomacy, involving the UN as well as concerns the issue of Cyprus. In 1956 the first Secretary-General of NATO, Britain's Lord Ismay, suggested to the North Atlantic Council that a committee be formed to mediate the Cyprus conflict, which divided the NATO allies Greece and Turkey.⁴⁰ When civil war broke out on the island in 1963, the British government, with the support of Washington, proposed sending in a NATO-recruited peacekeeping force of ten thousand men. This plan was rejected, however, by Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, who insisted that the UN Security Council, and not NATO, was the proper venue. A revised British plan which tied the NATO force fairly closely to the UN ('linking' it to the UN by 'reports'), was also refused by Makarios, even though the Greek and Turkish governments were willing to participate. The eventual outcome was the establishment in 1964 of the United Nations' Peacekeeping Force for Cyprus (UNFICYP) with NATO forces remaining in the background.⁴¹

When in 1974 the Turkish government, responding to appeals from Turkish Cypriots, landed on Cyprus with a large-scale armed force and set up the Republic of Northern Cyprus, NATO as an organization failed to react as it could and should have done. Despite the long-lasting deadlock on that island, it can at least be said, however, that the structure of NATO, together with the organization's military power and latent political influence, probably has helped to keep the problem of Cyprus (and perhaps other European subregional problems) contained. But without a diplomatically active and effective United Nations, a regional alliance formation cannot by itself easily transform stability into peace.

⁴⁰ Robert S. Jordan, with Michael W. Bloome, *Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), 37.

⁴¹ Miller, *World Order and Local Disorder*, 116–48; Karl Th. Birgisson, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus', in William J. Durch (ed.), *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), 219–36.

3. INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN PEACEMAKING: RECENT CASES

The end of the Cold War and the proliferation of ethnic and other conflicts have made it necessary, as never before, for regional organizations and the UN to work together—actually to co-operate, rather than merely to coexist. Although there is evidence that both categories of organization are becoming stronger, it remains to be seen whether they will become more united in action. Some involvement by the UN is clearly necessary for regional efforts, some of them unprecedented and innovative, to be made fully acceptable and practically effective. Organizational personalities, however, are not easily fused. Recent cases make the possibilities, as well as the difficulties, clear.

(a) *Central America and the Caribbean*

In the final phases of the East-West conflict in the 1980s, two phenomena stood out. The first was that the Organization of American States, which had been fairly effective in dealing especially with small Central American pacification problems, was for a time eclipsed.⁴² The 'awkward absence', as it has been called, of the main regional organization in managing the internal and international conflicts centred on Nicaragua and El Salvador is an indication of the disqualifying 'structural problems' of the OAS. The organizational genius, or individuality, of the OAS has existed mainly in the field of economic and social development. It was not equipped to quell a big-power-supported 'proxy' guerrilla war in its midst. It lacked the needed capability for that purpose.

A second surprise of the 1980s was the 'appearance' of *ad hoc* subregional formations, notably the four-power Contadora group (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama), the Lima Support Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay), and the combined Rio Group. This further detracted from the peacemaking com-

⁴² Jack Child, *The Central American Peace Process: Sheathing Swords, Building Confidence* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 9. For background, see Alan K. Henrikson, 'East-West Rivalry in Latin America: "Between the Eagle and the Bear"', in Robert W. Clawson (ed.), *East-West Rivalry in the Third World: Security Issues and Regional Perspectives* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986).

petence of the OAS.⁴³ As the OAS Secretary-General, Alejandro Orfila, frankly acknowledged: 'I believe that the OAS has paid a terrific price in terms of public opinion within the hemisphere, and also outside it, because of the existence of the Contadora group.'⁴⁴

According to Orfila, the OAS was not considered by some to be a forum 'in which to win—to get complete support for partisan positions'.⁴⁵ Regional groups, it has been noted, have often made some intra-regional parties feel that they are 'outsiders', ostracized by the rest.⁴⁶ The Nicaraguan Sandinista government, no doubt, did consider the US-dominated OAS to be hostile toward it. As the USA 'contributes the lion's share of the OAS budget', that country easily could prevent the organization from dealing independently or in a positive and substantive way with conflicts it did not wish the body to address. Moreover, there is the relative 'paucity of experience' of the OAS in the field of reconstructing international peace and security. All of these considerations pointed to the relative superiority of the UN even in dealing with the traditional OAS preserve of Central America.⁴⁷

At first the challenge was met by the Contadora partners and then by a new process of Central American presidential summit meetings initiated by Costa Rica's President Oscar Arias Sánchez, who sought to restore responsibility for resolving the crisis to Central Americans themselves.⁴⁸ The UN Security Council initially only 'nibbled around the edges' of the Central American problem by, for example, endorsing the ongoing efforts of the Contadora

⁴³ S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, 'Regional Organizations and Regional Security', *Security Studies*, 2/1 (Fall 1992), 21.

⁴⁴ Orfila, 'The Organization of American States and International Order in the Western Hemisphere', 141. The OAS was also slighted when, in Oct. 1983, the small subregional Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was the body that acted to deal with the disturbed situation in Grenada. The OECS requested US military intervention and also sent in an improvised Caribbean Defense Force.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*
⁴⁶ On this point, see Oscar Schachter, 'Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and Regional Organizations', in Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer (eds.), *Law and Force in the New International Order* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 86–9.

⁴⁷ This is the argument of MacFarlane and Weiss, 'Regional Organizations and Regional Security', 22.

⁴⁸ Luis G. Solís, 'Collective Mediations in the Caribbean Basin', in Carl Kaysen, Robert A. Pastor, and Laura W. Reed (eds.), *Collective Responses to Regional Problems: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean* (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1994), 110, 112.

group. Yet the UN Secretariat gradually became more active. At a low point in the talks in 1986, the Peruvian Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar made 'a gingerly *démarche*' to the Central American countries—in conjunction with his OAS counterpart, João Baena Soares—pointing out that the UN and the OAS, 'separately or jointly', could provide a number of useful services. This co-operative step, as his assistant for the Central American matter, Alvaro de Soto, reflects, had 'a catalytic effect'.⁴⁹

The outcome (the Arias-designed Esquipulas Agreement on regional democratization and pacification), followed by the creation of an impartial UN verification mechanism (the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)) and also establishment of an OAS mechanism (the International Commission of Support and Verification (CIAV/OAS)), was a diplomatic achievement of the first order. The UN engaged in peacekeeping in the western hemisphere for the first time. The OAS, reinforced by its partnership with the UN and also by the recent addition of Canada to OAS membership, gained a measure of independence from the USA and a renewed sense of its own mission. Despite their different procedures and the strains that occasionally resulted, the two organizations basically worked well together, and also with a variety of non-governmental organizations. The UN shared with the OAS the tasks of monitoring elections and of demobilizing military forces in and near Nicaragua. They also combined efforts in supervising the complex reconciliation process in El Salvador. On 15 January 1992, after more than twelve years of fighting, a ceremony of completion and rededication to peace was held in Santa Elena, El Salvador, with both OAS Secretary-General Baena Soares, and the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Chali, prominently participating.⁵⁰

The UN and the OAS have also been institutionally involved in dealing with instability in Haiti. The UN at first held itself aloof from the Haitian problem, which did not clearly raise issues of international peace and security. An open invitation from Haiti's

⁴⁹ Alvaro de Soto, 'Case Study: The Peace Process in Central America', *Singapore Seminar*, 42–6.

⁵⁰ 'The United Nations Role in the Central American Peace Process', UN Focus, DP/1036R-01201 (Feb. 1991); Terry Lynn Karl, 'El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution', *Foreign Affairs*, 71/2 (Spring 1992), 147–64; David Holiday and William Stanley, 'Building the Peace: Preliminary Lessons from El Salvador', *Journal of International Affairs*, 46/2 (Winter 1993), 415–38.

provisional President, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, to both the UN and the OAS to observe that country's election in December 1990, however, posed the question of their participating together. After lobbying by a former US President, Jimmy Carter, and a number of Caribbean area leaders, the UN finally acceded to her request, and Election Day (16 December) was witnessed by representatives of both world and regional organizations.

It was partly because of this early electoral involvement that, when a military coup on 30 September 1991 overthrew the recently elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the UN could not easily treat the Haitian problem as being 'essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' of a state (Article 2 (7)) and thus beyond the reach of the UN Charter. The OAS already seemed to have overcome its inhibitions regarding active 'domestic' interference to support constitutional government. The hemisphere (except for Cuba) was then, unprecedentedly, composed of democracies. At a historic meeting in Santiago, Chile, in June 1991, the participating members of the OAS had resolved that any 'sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process' in any one of their countries would result in the calling of an emergency meeting of foreign ministers to decide what to do.⁵¹ Invoking the so-called Santiago Commitment when the coup in Haiti occurred on 30 September, the OAS foreign ministers collectively urged: a mission to Port-au-Prince; the 'diplomatic isolation' of Lieut.-Gen. Raoul Cédras and the others who had illegally seized power there; and, except for humanitarian assistance, the suspension of economic, financial, and commercial ties with Haiti. Some OAS members even suggested an 'OAS force', to be mainly civilian but to have some lightly armed personnel along to provide protection.⁵² The idea of military enforcement, however, did not fit with the OAS's organizational personality, and nothing was done.

⁵¹ For further details, see Chapter 9.

⁵² Robert A. Pastor, *Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), 247–50; Richard J. Bloomfield, 'Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy? The OAS Defense-of-Democracy Regime', *Washington Quarterly*, 17/2 (spring 1994), 157–69; 'OAS Resolutions on Haiti', texts of 'Support to the Democratic Republic of Haiti', MRE/RES. 1/91 (3 Oct. 1991), and 'Support for Democracy in Haiti', MRE/RES. 2/91 (8 Oct. 1991), US Department of State Dispatch, 2/41 (14 Oct. 1991), 760–1; Thomas L. Friedman, 'A Regional Group Moves to Isolate Haiti's New Junta', *New York Times*, 3 Oct. 1991, and id., 'Regional Group Plans to Increase Penalties on Haiti', *New York Times*, 9 Oct. 1991.

A further reason for that organization's inability to follow through more effectively at that time was the merely supportive role of the UN. The UN then was 'outrun' by the regional organization, candidly admits Dante Caputo, a former Argentine Foreign Minister who, remarkably, was appointed Special Envoy for the Haitian situation by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and subsequently by OAS Secretary-General Baena Soares as well. The UN General Assembly, for its part, did pass a resolution which requested that the Secretary-General lend his OAS opposite number collegial support, condemned the coup led by General Cédras, and called upon all UN member states 'to emulate the OAS example' (i.e. by applying sanctions), as Caputo described this non-binding and hortatory action. Some extra-hemispheric countries, including members of European Community, continued to trade with Haiti, even by exporting oil to it, thus effectively 'nullifying' the OAS-recommended sanctions.⁵³

On the initiative of a new informal group—the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti (Canada, France, USA, and Venezuela)—the UN Security Council, invoking Chapter VII, in Resolution 841 (16 June 1993) did finally act to 'make universal and mandatory' the trade embargo previously recommended by the OAS and endorsed by the UN General Assembly. These measures required 'all States' and also 'all international organizations' (read: the European Community) to act strictly in accordance with their provisions, which were binding globally. This co-operative UN-OAS action made it possible that Haiti might be one case, in Dante Caputo's hopeful prediction, 'in which such sanctions could actually work'.⁵⁴ The sanctions regime later was tightened through Resolution 917 (6 May 1994). When even these stringent measures did not work to unseat the *de facto* government under Cédras, the USA persuaded the Security Council on 31 July to authorize 'a

⁵³ 'UN General Assembly Resolution 46/7 on Haiti', 12 Oct. 1991, *US Department of State Dispatch*, 2/41 (14 Oct. 1991), 762; Dante Caputo, 'Haiti: Un Cri de Cœur', *Global Action* (Newsletter of Parliamentarians for Global Action), 5/3, (Sept. 1993), 7 and 10. The European Community was handicapped somewhat by its Lomé Convention relationship with Haiti.

⁵⁴ 'UN Security Council Resolution 841 on Crisis in Haiti', 16 June 1993, *US Department of State Dispatch*, 4/26 (28 June 1993), 469–70; Caputo, 'Haiti', 10. The global-regional co-operative theme is explicit in SC Res. 841: 'Recalling... the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and stressing the need for effective co-operation between regional organizations and the United Nations.'

multilateral force under unified command and control... to use all necessary means'.⁵⁵

Owing to this sequence of events there has arisen some anxiety within the inter-American community lest the OAS fall into 'hierarchical' bondage to the UN.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, it had gradually become clear that, as a practical matter, the actions taken by the OAS to isolate the *de facto* regime in Haiti could not succeed without the constitutional authority and political backing of the UN. The actual forces used, however, were those of the USA, a hemispheric power, supplemented by personnel from a number of Caribbean Community (CARICOM) states with support from Argentina, Great Britain, and various other individual countries around the world. On 18 September 1994 the Cédras Government was persuaded to give way and the US-led Multinational Force made it possible for President Aristide to return to office. The OAS was essentially a bystander, although a combined UN-OAS International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) was enabled to resume its human-rights monitoring role. The subsequent post-restoration phase of the Haiti crisis was to be handled mainly by a UN peacekeeping mission (UNMIH) and President Clinton made it clear that 'the coalition will pass the baton to the United Nations', which it did.⁵⁷

(b) *West Africa, the African Horn, Southern Africa, and Central Africa*

It would seem impossible for any one organization to police the whole African continent. The structural weaknesses of the Organization of African Unity, which has plainly lacked the capability of handling conflicts located around that vast continent, and some-

⁵⁵ 'Shared Resolve in Restoring Democracy in Haiti', statement by Madeleine K. Albright and SC Res. 940, 31 July 1994, *US Department of State Dispatch*, 5/33 (15 Aug. 1994), 554–6.

⁵⁶ Brazil, as an elected member of the UN Security Council in 1993, pressed for a 'security'-based resolution to deal with Haiti partly in order to keep the UN out of other sensitive inter-American affairs, including not only human rights and democracy but also the realm of environmental protection: Bloomfield, 'Making the Western Hemisphere Safe for Democracy?', 165.

⁵⁷ 'The Crisis in Haiti', *US Department of State Dispatch*, 5/38 (19 Sept. 1994), 610. An extraneous, though strategically important, political reason behind the Clinton administration's turn to the UN, rather than the OAS, was its wish to set a precedent for close UN supervision of Russian-controlled CIS military peacekeeping intervention in the Caucasus region and Central Asia.

times even the political interest to do so, have contributed to peacekeeping experiments both at the subregional level and through the involvement of the UN.

The most remarkable case in point is the *ad hoc* military intervention carried out in Liberia in 1990 by ECOMOG—the 'Monitoring Group' of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). With offshore assistance from the US Navy and Marine Corps, ECOWAS, through this improvisation (at odds with its basic organizational personality as an economic-integration instrument) succeeded temporarily in bringing about a modicum of peace in that country, at least in its capital, Monrovia. To some sceptical Africans the ECOMOG forces provided by Nigeria and other English-speaking countries mostly served local hegemonic and partisan purposes—a recurrent complaint against regionally originated military interventions.⁵⁸ They came in there as a neutral party, hoping to bring about a mediation. But they're now one of the combatants', as the then US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman J. Cohen, admitted. This was one reason why it seemed to Cohen that the UN would have to take over as intermediary in the Liberian situation.⁵⁹

The UN did send a representative, Trevor Gordon-Somers of Jamaica. Yet the Liberian state had effectively collapsed, and there seemed little to repair. As one commentator noted, even the UN was 'not collectively in a position to intervene in that kind of a situation'.⁶⁰ Partly for that reason, the UN Security Council initially backed the ECOWAS peacekeeping operation by imposing a Chapter VII arms embargo against the rebel forces in Liberia and by calling on all parties there to respect a cease-fire that was negotiated. This action (Security Council Resolution 788 of 19 November 1992) is 'the first major UN effort to promote peacekeeping by a regional organization'.⁶¹

Subsequent negotiations conducted in Geneva under the joint auspices of ECOWAS, OAU, and the UN produced a peace agreement; this was signed at an ECOWAS summit meeting in Cotonou,

⁵⁸ MacFarlane and Weiss, 'Regional Organizations and Regional Security', 18–21.

⁵⁹ Steven A. Holmes, 'U.S. Tries to Blunt Harm of Remark on Liberia Peacekeepers', *New York Times*, 15 Nov. 1992.

⁶⁰ *The Singapore Symposium*, 19.

⁶¹ Peter James Spielmann, 'UN Approves Use of Force to Cut Off Liberia Rebels', *Boston Globe*, 20 Nov. 1992.

Benin, on 25 July 1993. The agreement called for ECOMOG to continue its peacekeeping function and for the UN to play a monitoring role through what became the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). An advance group of UN military observers participated in a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee that was set up. Without this technical and political support authorized by the UN Security Council, and also without the substantial humanitarian assistance extended by other parts of the UN system, these pioneering West African peacemaking efforts in Liberia could not have had much chance of success.⁶² Even with additional support from the UN, they still have not brought stability to that country.

The uncivil conflict in Somalia on the Horn of Africa has put the principle of regional-organizational priority—specifically that of the OAU—to an embarrassingly severe test. Boutros-Ghali, being an Egyptian and formerly himself active in the Organization of African Unity as his country's Foreign Minister, was personally affected by the Somali tragedy—as Pérez de Cuéllar was by the conflict in Central America. He therefore followed his predecessor's lead in directly taking up the Somali issue. Calling together in Cairo regional leaders from the OAU, the Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Boutros-Ghali pointed out their responsibilities (no doubt reflecting upon Chapter VIII, as well as Chapter VI) and sharply enquired as to their plans. Talks also were held in New York under UN, OAU, LAS, and OIC auspices with the contending Somali parties also present.

However, as none of the regional organizations asserted primacy in the situation, the UN increasingly stepped in. The first physical measure taken by the UN, in April 1992, was to assign some fifty unarmed military observers to Somalia. The ineffectuality of that action, long-delayed in actual execution, led to the Security Council's later authorization of an airlift. The Security Council resolution expressly welcomed 'the cooperation between the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and Organization of the Islamic Conference in resolving the situation in Somalia'. This had little practical effect. On 3 December 1992 the Security Council authorized (via SC Res. 794) the UN membership, with the USA leading the way, to intervene with force

⁶² Cindy Shiner, 'A Disarming Start', *Africa Report*, 39/3 (May–June 1994), 62–4.

in Somalia in order to deliver the needed assistance. This was an important precedent for the UN, as the first time the Security Council authorized military intervention 'for strictly humanitarian purposes'.⁶³ The UN thereafter found itself virtually responsible for reconstructing civic order—'painting nations blue', in Douglas Hurd's memorable phrase.⁶⁴

Yet to the new Clinton administration, 'nation-building' seemed increasingly an impossible task and American forces, the vanguard and main body of the Unified Task Force, were therefore soon scheduled for complete withdrawal. The UN operation (UNOSOM II) that replaced it did not seem any more likely to be successful. In early 1995 it, too, was withdrawn. It can plausibly be argued, in retrospect, that had early regional intercession, mainly diplomatic, occurred rather than extra-continental military intervention, some kind of internal political arrangement might have been worked out. That, at any rate, is the assessment of Mohamed Sahnoun, the Algerian diplomat (formerly a Deputy Secretary-General of the OAU as well as Deputy Secretary-General of the Arab League) who served for a time as UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's Special Representative for Somalia. 'The first stage should be regional,' Sahnoun has said. 'In Somalia, the OAU should have done it.'⁶⁵

The priority of regional response, with the UN providing mainly substantive support, seems so far to have been the dominant lesson learned from the Somalian catastrophe. To the US government, wishing to distance itself from a disaster (not involving any vital national interest), the critical contribution required from the outside seemed to be 'reinforcement of Africans' own ability to resolve their internal and regional conflicts'. Given the limited financial resources available to and from the UN Organization, much of this help would have to come through US and other national foreign-aid programmes. Such assistance could build up

⁶³ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Report on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-seventh to the Forty-eighth Session of the General Assembly*, Sept. 1993 (New York: United Nations, 1993), 148.

⁶⁴ Paul Lewis, 'Painting Nations Blue: Somalia Mission May Become Model for the U.N. in Other Failed Countries', *New York Times*, 9 Dec. 1992.

⁶⁵ Interview with Mohamed Sahnoun, 'It's difficult to point to a situation where armed intervention represented a solution', *Middle East Report*, 24/2-3 (Mar.-June 1994), 30. See also his *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1994).

the 'conflict-resolution capacity' of existing organizations in Africa, notably the OAU.⁶⁶ The UN could co-ordinate efforts as needed.

In situation after situation throughout Africa—from Angola and Mozambique in Southern Africa to Burundi and Rwanda in Central Africa—it usually has been, however, the UN that has assumed the primary responsibility. The OAU, though in 1993 it did finally begin to develop a permanent conflict-handling instrument (the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution), has often been 'the dog that did not bark'.⁶⁷ It was thus the UN that fielded the Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), which verified the departure of Cuban troops in 1988 and subsequently monitored elections in that country. It was the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) that has worked to implement a peace agreement between the Government and resistance movement there. It was the UN (with African countries lobbying at UN Headquarters in New York as well as working through the OAU) that for so long applied effective international pressure against the former apartheid regime in South Africa. It was the UN that sent a team into Burundi and has taken the lead, though not with constant effort or effect, in dealing with horrifying conditions of genocide in Rwanda.

The Rwandan case clearly presents the need for close global—regional co-operation in Africa. The effort of the UN and OAU are mutually dependent. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recalls: 'I have written a letter to the Secretary-General of the OAU [Salim Ahmed Salim], to the President of the OAU [Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak], asking them, please send troops, announce that you are ready to participate in the peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, and this will help me to obtain from the Security Council and from the donor countries the financial assistance necessary to reinforce the United Nations presence on the ground.' Without such a commitment from African countries, Boutros-Ghali feared, donor countries would say, 'Why must we be more royalist than the king?' At the same time, the UN Secretary-General emphasized the supremacy, ascendancy, and capability of his organization by noting that 'the leadership is supposed to be the Security Council. They

⁶⁶ Herman J. Cohen, 'Peace-keeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa', *US Department of State Dispatch*, 4/16 (19 Apr. 1993), 270-2.

⁶⁷ MacFarlane and Weiss, 'Regional Organizations and Regional Security', 15.

decide it, they have the mandate, they have the power, they have the financial capacity to send force.⁶⁸

If the West African countries could get together subregionally to send a force to Liberia, Boutros-Ghali and others have reasoned, then the countries of East and Central Africa ought to be able to co-operate within their area to assist Rwanda. The experience gained by Ghanaian troops in ECOMOG, if shared through joint action and training, could strengthen such an East-Central African effort. The OAU, with its new Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, could take responsibility for fostering a durable peace settlement in the locale, if not for mustering an all-African peacekeeping force. Transportation and other technical support would have to come from wealthy outside countries such as France, Great Britain, the USA, and Japan. On 13 May 1994 the UN Security Council did finally agree to a plan which, though confined in purpose to shielding civilian refugees and protecting aid workers, was designed eventually to send as many as 5,500 peacekeeping troops to Rwanda.⁶⁹ Since early 1994 the organizational mainstay in the tragic Rwandan situation, apart from the militarily victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front, has been the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), led by a Canadian and made up of African as well as non-African personnel.

(c) *South-East Asia and North-East Asia*

Probably the most ambitious UN-sponsored regional peacemaking project of all, involving the actual supervision of a nation's administration as well as management of its elections, has been the work of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Based on the October 1991 Paris Peace Agreements on Cambodia among the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council together with interested states from Asia and the Pacific and the major factions inside Cambodia itself, the comprehensive UNTAC operation, headed by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative Yasushi Akashi, supervised elections in May 1993 which established a new government for Cambodia.

⁶⁸ *ABC News Nightline*, 4 May 1994.

⁶⁹ Paul Lewis, 'U.N. Chief Seeks an African Peace Force for Rwanda', *New York Times*, 5 May 1994; id., 'Security Council Agrees on Plan to Send Peace Force to Rwanda', *New York Times*, 14 May 1994.

UNTAC, as Akashi has described it, was 'a genuine global effort', but it also had 'significant regional input'. Members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other governments in Asia that were actively involved all sent contingents.⁷⁰ The so-called UN plan for Cambodia was actually not a UN proposal. It originated with the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC), co-chaired by ASEAN-member Indonesia and France. From the early 1980s, however, the UN kept in close touch with the continuing South-East Asian regional discussions. UN Under-Secretary-General Rafeuddin Ahmed, for example, was invited every year to meet with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the time of their annual ministerial meetings.⁷¹ The culminating accomplishment in Cambodia—the May 1993 elections—was thus truly a combined global-regional diplomatic effort. That has been a factor in ensuring its continued success.

The other trouble spot in the Asian-Pacific region that has posed a major threat to international peace and security has been Korea. The North Korean government under President Kim Il-Sung, now deceased, appeared to be developing a nuclear-weapons capacity. It was the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an autonomous functional intergovernmental agency, that took the lead in meeting this challenge, which in 1994 was nearly brought to the UN Security Council for the possible application of sanctions. No Chapter VIII regional arrangement or agency exists for North-East Asia, although various suggestions for a 'multilateral dialogue' regarding the stabilization of the area have been offered over the years. Through the new ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which though based on the Association of South-East Asian Nations grouping also involves South Korea as well as Japan, China, Russia, the USA, New Zealand, Australia, and Europe, an inter-regional approach to Asian Pacific security issues might increasingly be taken. Eventually, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) grouping might also be able to act in a political way, although

⁷⁰ Yasushi Akashi, 'UNTAC in Cambodia: Lessons for U.N. Peace-keeping', text of Third Charles Rostov Lecture, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, 14 Oct. 1993; Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict', *Journal of International Affairs*, 46/2 (Winter 1993), 439–67.

⁷¹ Rafeuddin Ahmed, 'The United Nations Peace Plan for Cambodia', *Singapore Seminar*, 65.

presumably it will remain chiefly concerned with trade, investment, and development issues.

Rejecting the need for a unitary defensive pact, President Clinton, sharing a general view, has argued that '[T]he challenge for the Asian Pacific in this decade, instead, is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and opportunities.' These could 'function like overlapping plates of armour, individually providing protection and together covering the full body of our common security concerns.'⁷² To the extent that such subregional 'plates of armour' actually are forged for Asia and the Pacific, they probably will resemble alliances more than international organizations. They are not likely to displace the UN which, as a law-making and action-warranting body, is a sceptre as well as a shield.

(d) *South-Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia*

The establishment of Western relations with the countries of the collapsed Soviet bloc constitutes a heroic inter-organizational task and a profound diplomatic puzzle. There are more organizations in the wider European sphere than in any other part of the world and, in consequence, there has been a good deal of duplication and resulting mutual irritation. In close co-operation with the USA and Canada, the nations of Western Europe have in recent years joined together with members of the disbanded Warsaw Pact to form the twin foundations—NATO plus the OSCE—for something beginning to approximate what some have conceived of as a 'European security order'.⁷³ In addition, the Maastricht Treaty of December 1992 committed the European Community members to an 'ever closer Union' in foreign policy and also to formation of an identity in dealing with security and defence issues. Subsequently, together with the existing Western European Union, the new European

Union (EU) has begun to develop new capabilities. The Franco-German Eurocorps, a EU-sponsored stability pact on frontiers and ethnic disputes, and the NATO-endorsed plan for 'separable, but not separate' Combined Joint Task Forces can all be seen as working towards a European security and defence identity. A further consolidated and expanding European Union could in time become a foundation for not only Western security but also for a wider Eurasian stability. The notional Vancouver-to-Vladivostok reach of the OSCE, with NATO and the EU/WEU working solidly within it, is virtually hemispheric in scope.⁷⁴

The deficiency of many such pan-regional, Euro-Atlantic security schemes is their relative lack of normative and, more specifically, legal-juridical content, and the fact that new peacemaking roles seem to depend of necessity on the international legitimacy provided by the UN. The CSCE's 1992 designation of itself as a Chapter VIII 'Regional Arrangement' is one move in that direction. It seems an attempt to gain more acceptability as a possible mandating authority, even though Article 53(1) clearly states that 'no enforcement action' at least is allowed without Security Council authorization. The increasing practical co-operation between the UN and NATO, from the level of their Secretaries-General down to operating levels in the field, is a comparable global-regional *rapprochement*. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner, with colleagues in and outside the Alliance, developed in the early 1990s a doctrine of 'interlocking institutions' partly in order to ensure NATO's international licence to act. Yet he readily acknowledged: 'The UN or the CSCE would retain overall authority'.⁷⁵

The UN-NATO institutional relationship, as Secretary-General Wörner envisioned it, would be basically complementary—the strengths of the one offsetting the weaknesses of the other. The two organizations' capabilities, however, like their organizational personalities (almost mutually allergic) are very different. Even the

⁷² Fundamentals of Security for a New Pacific Community', address by President Clinton before the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, 19 July 1993, *US Department of State Dispatch*, 4/29 (19 July 1993), 509–12.

⁷³ See e.g. Loïc Bouvard (France) and Bruce George (United Kingdom), Co-Rapporteurs, and Jacek Szymanderski (Poland), Associate Rapporteur, 'Draft Interim Report: Working Group on the New European Security Order', Political Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, AI 263, PC/ES (91) 2, International Secretariat, Oct. 1991, and Hans Binnendijk, 'The Emerging European Security Order', *Washington Quarterly*, 14/4 (Fall 1991), 67–81.

⁷⁴ On the development of the US-EU 'Transatlantic Declaration' relationship, emphasizing its broad geographic and political span, see Alan K. Henrikson, 'The New Atlanticism: Western Partnership for Global Leadership', *Revue d'intégration européenne/Journal of European Integration*, 16/2–3 (Winter-Spring, 1993), 165–91.

⁷⁵ Manfred Wörner, speech at the 38th General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Brussels, 30 Oct. 1992; 'Interlocking Institutions: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)', *Basic Fact Sheet* (NATO Office of Information and Press), 6 (Sept. 1993).

most extraordinary personal dedication of UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, Wörner frankly pointed out, could not solve the basic problem that the UN 'lacks the infrastructure, the logistics, and the command and control facilities for major military operations'. Only NATO could offer those assets, 'at least in the European theatre'. Yet Wörner also recognized that action by NATO would require legitimization. Co-operation with the UN 'facilitates the Alliance's new role in crisis management' by placing NATO's efforts 'in a broad, internationally accepted context' and also by increasing 'public awareness and acceptance of crisis management'. The future, he hoped, 'may well see frequent and close co-operation between the UN and NATO'.⁷⁶

This prophecy has been borne out, most particularly in the area of the former Yugoslavia. Following the attack on a market-place in Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 5 February 1994, the UN through Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali asked NATO, even though not a Chapter VIII regional organization and therefore not capable of being 'utilized' (under Article 53(1)), to prepare for carrying out air strikes against the Bosnian Serb gun positions around Sarajevo, should such acts be asked for. Clearly, however, the Secretary-General and the Security Council-authorized Protection Force (UNPROFOR) did not wish to surrender UN operational control over the situation. Nonetheless the UN-NATO exchange seemed to demonstrate, at least formally, that, as US Permanent Representative on the Security Council Madeleine Albright said, 'the United Nations and the alliance can co-operate together'.⁷⁷

The actual execution of UN-NATO co-operation following the so-called Sarajevo ultimatum has proved to be far more difficult than their rhetorical solidarity would suggest. On the one hand, the threat of NATO air strikes to force the Bosnian parties' compliance undeniably has given UN officials on the ground, the senior-most being the Secretary-General's representative, Yasushi Akashi, an increased practical credibility. Yet, on the other, his reputation for

⁷⁶ Manfred Wörner, 'A New NATO for a New Era', speech at that National Press Club, Washington, DC, 6 Oct. 1993. Cf. the careful reciprocating statement of the UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan, 'UN Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO', *NATO Review*, 41/5 (Oct. 1993), 3-7.

⁷⁷ Paul Lewis, 'UN Asks NATO to Prepare for Air Strikes Against Bosnian Serbs', *New York Times*, 7 Feb. 1994.

impartiality suffered. Akashi has acknowledged: 'It's very tough to reconcile the UN's traditional role as a peacekeeper with the use of force, in this case air power from NATO'.⁷⁸ The one organization was attempting to remain fair-minded while the other was trying to prove itself forceful. Wörner's successor as NATO Secretary-General, Belgium's Willy Claes, observed: 'The UN is trying to balance itself between opposing forces as a peacekeeping operation, while NATO is an efficient military machine wanting quick reprisals for any breaches of agreement'.⁷⁹ The UN-NATO 'dual-key' approach was difficult to maintain in such circumstances. However, the two organizations desperately needed and have had to depend on each other in containing the spread of chaos in southeastern Europe.

The European Union has intermittently been another organizational partner in Balkan diplomacy. After a surprising start in late 1991 when, without any institutional preparation for doing so, Brussels quickly dispatched some EC 'monitors', the organization failed to follow through, not least because it does not itself have any peacekeeping capability. As UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recalled, 'The whole operation was begun by the European Community'. He further explained: 'According to Article 52 of the UN Charter, regional disputes are supposed to be solved at the regional level, so we abstained from intervening because there already was a regional organization involved'. When, later, the UN also became directly involved in the Yugoslav imbroglio, 'we decided to make a kind of clear division of labour'. The Europeans were dealing with 'the peace process', so the United Nations confined its role to 'maintaining a cease-fire'. The UN and EC became intertwined when they together convened in London the International Conference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This created 'a new framework', Boutros-Ghali notes. It was a joint, global-regional production. The Conference had 'co-chairs' and demonstrated the two organizations' 'equal responsibility'.⁸⁰

Yet another peace partner, the Conference on Security and Co-

⁷⁸ Roger Cohen, 'Man in the Middle Calls on Confucius', *New York Times*, 26 Apr. 1994.

⁷⁹ Jonathan Clayton, 'UN Backs NATO on Bosnia', *Boston Globe*, 23 Oct. 1994.

⁸⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Setting a New Agenda for the United Nations' (interview), *Journal of International Affairs*, 46/2 (Winter 1993), 295-6.

operation in Europe, appeared even better suited, theoretically, to try to resolve the Yugoslav conflict. The CSCE did, for example, send a symbolically important monitoring mission to Kosovo, inside Serbia-Montenegro. Yet the crisis exposed its structural weaknesses, not least of these being its requirement of consensus in decision-making. (The government of the rump state of Yugoslavia, which for a time still participated in the CSCE, was in a position to block action—a circumstance giving rise to the formula, promoted by German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, of 'consensus minus one'.) Clearly, a more authoritative, consolidated, and competent Europe-wide approach to peacemaking was needed. Many lamented the institutional incapacity of Europe as an actor in its own region.

The main responsibility for bringing about a settlement of the Bosnia-Herzegovina problem has fallen to an *ad hoc* Contact Group, a team of foreign ministers comprising the troika of the European Union together with the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain, the USA, and the Russian Federation, plus the co-chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. With the UN Security Council holding itself quietly in reserve to authorize either a tightening or a lifting of sanctions against the Yugoslav parties, the Contact Group continued to try to move the combatants toward 'an equitable and balanced overall settlement' by dividing territory, with 'incentives and disincentives' to be brought into play as needed.⁸¹

Other 'inter-European crises' extending across the vast expanse of Eurasia—Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia/Abkhazia, and Tajikistan, to name only a few—will require either solitary organizational sufficiency, assumed by the newly renamed OSCE (whose Minsk Group has taken the diplomatic lead in dealing with Nagorno-Karabakh), by the UN (which is trying to lead the peace-making activity in Georgia/Abkhazia), or combined organizational action, perhaps involving NATO. The Western allies, still reluctant to offer full NATO-integration to the countries of the former Eastern bloc, have sought to extend a securing influence through their November 1991 North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) scheme and, from January 1994, also the Partnership for

Peace (PfP). The new Government and parliament of Russia, lacking enthusiasm for either of these NATO-sponsored projects, none the less have in principle accepted them. In the view of Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, the fifty-two-nation OSCE instead should be developed, and be granted 'permanent leadership and co-ordination' over both NATO and the European Union/WEU, as well as over the Russian Federation's proto-regional Commonwealth of Independent States.⁸² Russia's signature of a Partnership for Peace agreement with NATO, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has made clear, should not lead to the 'juxtaposition' of NATO against other institutions but, rather, to 'co-ordination' under OSCE auspices. Of course, this would not mean establishing the OSCE as a hierarchical 'leader' or 'commander', he allowed.⁸³

With regard to some of the conflictual situations in Eurasia, the UN might be able to do no more than non-committally to 'take note of' what other arrangements or agencies, especially the Russians in the CIS, might attempt to do by way of peacemaking.⁸⁴ It should at least try to gain Russia's acknowledgement that requests for UN blessing of peacekeeping missions in the area of the former Soviet Union are subject to 'the same guidelines' as such operations anywhere else.⁸⁵ Too direct a challenge to the dominant Russian/CIS hand in the Caucasus and Central Asia, it is realistically feared in Washington and other Western capitals, could cause the Russian government to block American or European action in Haiti or in Bosnia if UN Security Council approval is sought. Regardless of the UN Organization's own peacemaking capabilities or lack thereof, it is now generally recognized, on both sides of the former Cold War divide, that for pragmatic-political reasons as well as for moral-legal ones the involvement of the UN in regional peacekeeping is virtually inescapable.

⁸² Bruce Clark, 'Grachev Calls for Wider Co-operation on Security', *Financial Times*, 26 May 1994.

⁸³ Andrei V. Kozyrev, 'Russia and NATO: A Partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe', *NATO Review*, 42/4 (Aug. 1994), 3-6.

⁸⁴ Paul Lewis, 'Russia Seeking U.N. Backing for Caucasus Force', *New York Times*, 27 June 1994.

⁸⁵ Madeleine K. Albright, 'Realism and Idealism in American Foreign Policy Today', Commencement address, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 8 June 1994, *US Department of State Dispatch*, 5/26 (27 June 1994), 434-7.

⁸¹ 'Foreign Ministers Contact Group Meeting on Bosnia', communiqué, 30 July 1994, *US Department of State Dispatch*, 5/33 (15 Aug. 1994), 553-4.

4. THE UN, REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND AN AGENDA FOR PEACE

As the foregoing analysis of past and recent cases of peace intervention has made apparent, new forms of inter-organizational cooperation for peace making purposes are becoming possible.⁸⁶ UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's 1992 report to the Security Council, *An Agenda for Peace*, remains the *locus classicus* of the continuing discussion of global-regional relations in the field of peace and security.⁸⁷

During the Cold War, Boutros-Ghali critically noted, 'regional organizations worked on occasion against resolving disputes in the manner foreseen in the Charter'. With the end of that conflict, they could more easily work together with the UN. Accepting that the UN Charter 'provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies', he stressed that the Charter allows 'useful flexibility' for undertakings by state groupings. Relevant 'associations or entities' included 'treaty-based organizations' (created either before or after the founding of the UN), 'regional organizations for mutual security and defence', 'organizations for general regional development or for co-operation on a particular economic topic or function', and 'groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern'. Clearly, the intent was to cast the widest possible net for future region-based partnership with the UN.

Praising 'a rich variety of complementary efforts', Boutros-Ghali argued against any standard or rigid framework. 'Just as no two regions or situations are the same, so the design of co-operative work and its division of labour must adapt to the realities of each case with flexibility and creativity.' In the post-Cold War 'new era of opportunity', regional arrangements or agencies could render great service in fulfilling the tasks highlighted elsewhere in *An*

⁸⁶ e.g. Alan K. Henrikson, *Defining a New World Order: Toward a Practical Vision of Collective Action for International Peace and Security* (Medford, Mass.: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1991), 19-23, in which it is proposed, *inter alia*, that national peacekeeping units be designated for regional use, that base-sharing arrangements be negotiated, and that inter-regional organizational security ties be formed.

⁸⁷ See section VII of *An Agenda for Peace*, 'Co-operation with regional arrangements and organizations', from which subsequent quotations are taken. For the Secretary-General's early views regarding regionalism, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Contribution à l'étude des ententes régionales* (Paris: A. Pedone, 1949).

Agenda for Peace specifically, those of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and post-conflict peace-building. Such activities, however, must be 'undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter', particularly if their relationships with the UN, especially the Security Council, were 'governed by Chapter VIII'. Under the Charter, he emphasized, the Security Council has, and will continue to have, 'primary responsibility' for maintaining international peace and security.

But regional organizations would have a larger role. Regional action 'as a matter of decentralization, delegation and co-operation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs'. Implicitly, Boutros-Ghali confirmed the known fact that the UN was becoming overburdened and could not afford or otherwise manage to carry on all of the peace-operations that were necessary. He seemed also to acknowledge that the moral authority of the UN, particularly the Security Council after the Persian Gulf War, was in question and needed 'democratic', including multi-regional, buttressing. Regional arrangements and agencies, the Secretary-General clearly believed, could strengthen both the sinews and the sense of world community.

How could their contributions be facilitated? Boutros-Ghali suggested a number of possible ways, ranging from mere diplomatic communication with the UN through inter-organizational collaborative measures to actual UN-designation of a regional body to act on its behalf. 'Consultations', he noted, could do much to build international consensus on 'the nature of a problem' and also on 'the measures required to address it'. Members of regional organizations participating 'in complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings' might encourage other states, outside the region, to act in support. Should the Security Council choose—in accordance with the terms of Article 53(1) presumably—to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, such an endorsement would 'lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort'.

The Secretary-General's September 1993 annual *Report on the Work of the Organization*, noting the enormous expansion that recently had taken place in the number and scope of peacekeeping

operations, expressed regret over the difficulty in securing sufficient military observers and infantry. However it made no comprehensive proposal, involving an increased focus and reliance on regions, to solve what was coming to be known as 'The Crisis in Peacekeeping'.⁸⁸ In *Building Peace and Development*, his 1994 report, he described a meeting he had convened in New York on 1 August 1994 ('the first meeting of its kind') between himself and the heads of regional bodies. The purpose of this event was to 'assess' existing co-operation between the UN and regional organizations with a view to 'further enhancing' it. Those in attendance were the CIS, Commonwealth Secretariat, EU, LAS, NATO, OAU, OAS, OIC, and WEU. ECOWAS was invited as well, but was unable to attend. The participants, as Boutros-Ghali reported their views, were in broad agreement that 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' remained with the Security Council. At the same time, they acknowledged the desirability of 'decentralizing some tasks'. In the view of many delegations 'the key' to closer co-operation and co-ordination between the UN and regional organizations was 'a smooth and constant exchange of information on emerging crises at a sufficiently early stage'. Among the specific substantive issues discussed at the meeting were the training of peacekeeping personnel from regional organizations, co-ordination of command and control for joint peacekeeping operations, and co-ordination of the implementation and verification of sanctions under Chapter VII.⁸⁹

In a public 'Beleaguered Are the Peacemakers' appeal, Boutros-Ghali summarized the UN case for increased help from and to regional organizations.⁹⁰ His reasoning proceeded by quick steps: 'The UN invented peacekeeping.' 'Peacekeeping today has become

⁸⁸ Boutros-Ghali, *Report on the Work of the Organization*, 66, 102, 103-4. See also Adam Roberts, *The Crisis in Peacekeeping*, Forsvarsstudier 2 (Oslo: Institutt for Forvarsstudier, 1994).

⁸⁹ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Building Peace and Development 1994: Report on the Work of the Organization from the Forty-ninth Session of the General Assembly* (New York: UN Department of Information, 1994), 257-8. Evidently pleased with this 'useful exchange of views', he expressed his 'intention to hold further meetings of this kind'. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 Jan. 1995, in *An Agenda for Peace 1995*, 2nd edn., with the new supplement and related UN documents (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995), 31.

⁹⁰ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'Beleaguered Are the Peacemakers', *New York Times*, 30 Oct. 1994. Subsequent quotations are from this text.

far more complicated.' 'These changes require greater involvement of regional organizations and arrangements.' Such groups can 'help ease the financial and material burdens' placed on the UN. They can 'provide special insights' into conflicts in their various regions. They also sometimes can 'respond more quickly militarily'. He insisted, however, that 'unity of command is essential' lest the different types of UN-authorized activity in a situation counteract each other. Thus the 'new regionalism' is a 'challenge', as Boutros-Ghali ambivalently called it. Regional entities could 'enhance the efficiency and effectiveness' of UN efforts for peace, and their involvement would further 'democratize' the international system. But the very features that made their involvement effective could make them seem 'threatening'. Regional involvement might in particular, raise old fears of 'hegemony' and 'intervention'. Therefore, methods of UN-regional co-operation must be improved, presumably on the basis of UN guidelines. 'We must take care that new regionalism does not become an alternative to multilateralism.' The resurgence of 'spheres of influence' and the 'resurgent rekindling of old regional hostilities'—implicitly, the Cold War—would deal 'a serious blow to collective security', the Secretary-General warned.

5. TOWARDS A GLOBAL-REGIONAL PEACEMAKING 'SYSTEM'

The arguments for better co-operation between the UN and regional organizations may now be drawn together, and also reconsidered in a broader context. The case here to be presented is threefold. Its purpose is to suggest the outlines of a comprehensive global-regional peacemaking 'system', or more practical working partnership between international bodies on a world and regional scale.

The first general reason for a more systemic approach is political. It arises from the fact that we are now witnessing both what might be termed 'a world-wide trend toward regionalism'—that is, the tightening of the world's focus on the concrete problems and prospects of nations and other social groups in their regional settings—and development in the environmental, demographic, technological, and other fields of a planetary consciousness. Ethnic and

other problems have come to the fore locally. Economic interdependence, mass migration, and universal telecommunication have extended human contact globally. Regional and planetary awarenesses are emerging at the same time.

The political challenge is to find the right vantages upon these somewhat paradoxical regional and global tendencies. Wisdom would seem to lie in a 'bifocal' perspective. Problems must be seen both 'from the inside out' (by the inhabitants, residing in regions) and 'from the outside in' (by diplomats located in metropolitan capitals and at UN Headquarters).⁹¹ There is no one, logically central, privileged angle of vision upon international politics anymore, as might have seemed to be the case in 1945 or even in 1989 and 1991. Not least of the important current changes is that many non-Western societies, notably the Chinese and the Islamic worlds, are beginning to project their own, competing designs upon international relations.⁹² Regions and regionalism, if viewed non-centrally, might seem less incoherent and less incompatible with traditional ideas of world order. And, as Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has suggested, regionalization, or decentralization, can help bring further international 'democratization' and with it, perhaps, greater stability to the world.

A second reason for finding new global-regional relationships is broadly institutional, having to do less with intellectual perspective than with organizations and procedures. It seems important not so to emphasize the distinct personalities, or specialized roles, of the OAS, OAU, NATO, or other regional or subregional entity that this interferes with understanding of the vital function of the main body, the 'trunk' of the world system. The Charter and the Organization of the United Nations provide the essential framework for world co-operation. The 'dilemma of regionalism', a wise American internationalist who served at the UN, Ernest Gross, once wrote, is how 'to coalesce the parts without fragmenting the whole'.⁹³ The entire assemblage, a kind of organism, must live as a unit.

Many proposals are being put forward today—some of them occasioned by the UN's fiftieth anniversary in 1995—to bring

⁹¹ Sahnoun, *Somalia*, p. xii.

⁹² Cf. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs*, 72/3 (Summer 1993), 22–49.

⁹³ Ernest A. Gross, *The United Nations: Structure for Peace* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), 47.

regional organizations and the world organization into a closer relation. Certain of these ideas are too formalistic. Among them is the suggestion that regional organizations (e.g. the European Union) actually be eligible for permanent seats on the UN Security Council, alongside or instead of their constituent national governments. The 'current chairman or president of their supreme organs' would exercise their Security Council memberships.⁹⁴ The risk is that these regional components would be fused into the central skeletal system in such a way as either to unduly subordinate the regional organizations or to give them undue sway, depending on their strength relative to the UN.

A better answer would lie in multi-organizational 'networking', in greater or lesser proximity.⁹⁵ Its main purpose would be to share the knowledge of central and regional organizations in relatively informal ways. Some methods that have been suggested include: the frequent regional-rotation of holders of the non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council, perhaps to be expanded; regular regional organization–Security Council meetings to discuss issues pertinent to different regions; and the appointment of a high-ranking Secretariat member, acting as 'rapporteur or co-ordinator' for the Security Council, 'to serve as a focal point for greater flow of information and a feedback mechanism' through contacts with regional group chairmen at the UN.⁹⁶

An implication of this model is that regional bodies and the central world institution no longer would have to be relied on solely or exclusively for performance of their own 'charter' tasks, narrowly and rigidly conceived. All organizations would be constantly adjusting while interacting. Through two-way (three-way, *n*-way) communication and the resulting reciprocal influencing that would occur, the peripheral and central international institutions would monitor, moderate, and even modify the essential processes of each

⁹⁴ Report of the 'Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council', chaired by Ambassador Samuel Insanally, Permanent Representative of Guyana to the UN and President of the 48th General Assembly, 28 Feb. 1994; see pp. 7, 12, 28.

⁹⁵ This idea of 'networking' has been suggested by Sidney W. Witnik. Multi-organizational networking could admit of some, if limited, formal connections between the UN and region-based bodies, e.g. the May 1993 UN–CSCE 'framework agreement'. On this relatively loose arrangement, see Wilhelm Hönynck, 'CSCE Works to Develop Its Conflict Prevention Potential', *NATO Review*, 42/2 (Apr. 1994), 20.

⁹⁶ Report of the 'Open-Ended Working Group', 7, 17, 18.

other, altering many regional-universal interconnections. The whole 'system' would change. Some institutions might take on new roles, as ECOWAS did, and others might abandon old functions. ASEAN, for example, might assume more peace-and-security responsibility, through the ARF, while NATO, might become a more political and even through its contact with the UN and the EU, economic organization.

These lively, human, inter-organizational exchanges ought not to be conceived of as existing on different 'levels', in some structural-legal hierarchy. Primacy is not the issue. The ideal operating rule for the new partnership should be function, not form. Regional organizations and the UN can best work together on a kind of collegial basis—as 'fellow' organizations, to use John Galvin's expression in describing relations between the UN and NATO during the Persian Gulf conflict.⁹⁷ There should be no thought of 'subcontracting', as the UN-NATO relationship during the Bosnia conflict sometimes has been characterized. It might be noted that there can be subcontracting 'upward'—from regional groupings to the UN—as well as subcontracting 'downward'—from the UN to them.⁹⁸

A possible consequence of a global-regional network might be provision for resources- or revenue-sharing between and among institutions—a kind of inter-organizational Lend-Lease, or 'swap' system. One or another international organization will get caught 'short' as political crises and security problems, often unpredictable, arise without adequate budgetary or material provision having been made for them.⁹⁹ There are, at bottom, just two kinds of institutions: those that have money (e.g. NATO and the European Union) and those that do not (e.g. most agencies of the UN system and also many Chapter VIII regional organizations). Arrangements

⁹⁷ General John R. Galvin, remarks at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass., 16 Sept. 1992.

⁹⁸ Thomas G. Weiss, 'The United Nations and Civil Wars', *Washington Quarterly*, 17/4 (Fall 1994), 151, noting particularly the cases of Cambodia and Central America. Regional leaders in effect called upon the services of the UN.

⁹⁹ Although inter-organizational funds-sharing is not discussed in the Report by the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing co-chaired by Shijuro Ogata and Paul Volcker (*Financing an Effective United Nations* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1993)), the group did consider 'borrowing' by the UN, though it rejected this idea in favour of increased national assessments, establishment of a larger revolving fund, and payment of more future costs of UN peacekeeping out of individual member countries' defence budgets.

could and should be negotiated for shifting assets to those institutions that most need and can best use them. It surely would be more 'cost-effective', for example, for Western governments and their organizations to subsidize the OAU's new Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution than to intervene themselves to try to maintain peace and security throughout Africa.¹⁰⁰ Even the UN-affiliated Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) might be called upon to support regional peace. Alvaro de Soto and a colleague have urged the establishment of a closer link between the UN and the Bretton Woods institutional group so as to introduce into peace-related operations 'the concept of rewards—the carrot'. At the very least, they propose, there ought to be enough flexibility to provide financial support for those reforms aimed at 'peace-related national governance'. Bank funding for the new National Civil Police in El Salvador is a case in point.¹⁰¹ More controversial, but still conceivable, would be Western (even NATO) financial support (perhaps via the NACC) for Russian/CIS peacekeeping operations in parts of Eurasia.¹⁰² Inter-organizational synergy has costs as well as rewards.

A third basic reason for a better, richer partnership between the UN family and international organizations involved in preserving regional peace and security is essentially a philosophical one. This is the argument of pluralism, for variety, but of variation acting within an overall world order. In the history of internationalist thought, the characteristics of civilization itself often have been assumed to derive from multiplicity—the Many in continual interplay within, and sometimes even working against, the One. The German historian Leopold von Ranke, in his 1833 essay on 'The Great Powers' (*Die Grossen Mächte*), likened the post-Napoleonic

¹⁰⁰ Lincoln P. Bloomfield, 'The Premature Burial of Global Law and Order: Looking Beyond the Three Cases from Hell', *Washington Quarterly*, 17/3 (Summer 1994), 155. Cf. the proposal of Mohamed Sahnoun for joint sponsorship by the UN and regional organizations of 'a monitoring system' in different parts of the world. Sahnoun, *Somalia*, xii.

¹⁰¹ Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, 'Obstacles to Peacebuilding', *Foreign Policy*, 94 (Spring 1994), 30. The need for broader help from the World Bank and IMF also is stressed in Erskine Childers, with Brian Uquhart, *Renewing the United Nations System* (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 1994), 77–84, 197–8.

¹⁰² Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in fact has suggested this to NATO. Kozyrev, 'Russia and NATO', 6.

order in Europe to a 'conversation'. A nation, like a single person, 'only feels happy', Ranke observed, 'when many-sided personalities, freely developed, meet on a higher common ground or indeed produce this very meeting-place by stimulating and complementing one another'.¹⁰³

Human freedom on an international scale consists in, and also depends on, having a 'choice of venue' among a variety of decision-making structures and the solutions they can offer in different places. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's conception of global 'democratization' partakes of such a larger vision. So too does the thinking of Andrei Kokoshin who, when Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow under the USSR, explained that, 'when searching for a new security structure to ensure stability, it would not be wise, even in Europe, for the Soviets to confine themselves to only one approach... After all, given the discouraging historical experience in this area, the Soviet Union can hardly trust one universal security structure'.¹⁰⁴

Taken together, these three general reasons—political, institutional, and philosophical—form a rationale for strongly supporting any serious attempt, such as that outlined by Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*, to bring the one, central international organization, the UN, into a functioning new partnership with the many regionally based ones. The new partners include regional alliances such as NATO as well as the growing list of Chapter VIII organizations—the OAS, OAU, and Arab League, now joined by the OSCE and, even more recently, the CIS. This broadly systemic goal, as the present chapter has argued, should be sought without unduly subordinating regionalism to globalism, for reasons of international political reality, needed organizational effectiveness, and the impulse of human freedom.

¹⁰³ The Great Powers (*Die Grossen Mächte*), in Theodore von Laue, *Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1950), 218.

¹⁰⁴ Andrei A. Kokoshin, *The Evolving International Security System: A View From Moscow*, CNA Occasional Paper (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, Dec. 1991), 27.

6

National Identity and the Revival of Regionalism

James Mayall

HISTORICALLY, nation and region have stood in much the same relationship to one another as actor and stage. The regions of the world, separated as much by history and culture as by oceans, deserts and mountains, provided the political space in which the drama of nation, state, and empire-building was enacted. Proximity frequently led to conflict over land, access to precious metals and other resources, trade routes, status, and religion. Proximity also made possible the dynastic and military alliances, the exchange of goods and services, and the diffusion of ideas, tastes, and values through which a modicum of security and welfare was provided and without which neither national cultures nor international society could have developed. The boundary between these separate regional worlds was seldom unambiguous, let alone impermeable; sometimes conflict across the line was deeply embedded—as in South-East Europe where the division between the Orthodox and Catholic worlds and between Christendom and Islam is often described by analogy to a geological 'faultline'. But, until the twentieth century, politics, like architecture, was constrained within a human scale.

The ground-plan of the modern world was laid down in the previous century. The consequences of European imperial expansion were far-reaching: for the first time all parts of the world were integrated within a single economy; and the wars of the great powers were also fought world-wide. As always, thought followed action—grand ideological and geopolitical theories were generated to explain what had happened. When European power was withdrawn in the mid-twentieth century, there was a predictable reaction. The concept of region ceased to be used in a purely descriptive sense, to denote a cultural or geographical area, and was increas-